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This thesis studies the economic development in transition and emerging 
economies with focus on three particular economic issues: production efficiency, 
physical investment rate and bank lending under bank ownership perspective. The thesis 
chooses to study transition and emerging economies because they have undergone many 
important reform processes that may be thought of as experiments of different policy 
choices which lead to different economic outcomes.  
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the 
literature on institutional economics and transition economies by confirming the 
significant role of institutional quality for efficiency and investment in a panel of 
transition economies. Better institutions are associated with higher efficiency levels and 
investment rates in transition economies. Given that investment is one of the key 
determinants of growth this means good institutions are important for growth in 
transition economies. Second, the thesis finds that banks of different ownership respond 
in remarkably different ways to monetary policies, which has important implication for 
the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. It also finds an asymmetric effect 
of monetary policy on bank lending with regard to the monetary conditions: in easy 
regime bank lending may not be affected my monetary tightening. This result calls for 
duly consideration of the ownership structure of the banking system when monetary 
policy and its effect on credit are studied.  
In summary, the thesis highlights the importance of institutional settings for 
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 CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
1.  MOTIVATION 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state 
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the 
people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, 
in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the 
authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in 
enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. 
Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state 
in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of 
government. 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 
 
Since Adam Smith, economists have long argued for the market institutions as 
pre-conditions for economic growth and prosperity. Though a huge amount of studies 
has been conducted on the subject of economic development the results have been 
unsatisfactory, or even retrogressive (North, 2000). The reason is that researchers take 
for granted the polities, demography and institutions which are essential building blocks 
for the existence and functioning of markets. In fact, neither neo-classical nor 
endogenous growth theories can explain why many developing countries are falling 
behind capital-rich developed countries in terms of growth rate. Differences in factor 
endowments cannot explain income gaps between countries though factor endowments 
are the foundation of various growth models. To understand how economies evolve to 




different directions with remarkably different outcomes we need to understand 
institutions.  
In the last two decades the literature on institutions has grown enormously 
following the seminal works of North (1981 & 1990) and Williamson (1985). 
Especially, with great efforts to quantify institutions by authors and organizations like 
Fraser Institution, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Transparency International, 
Daniel Kaufmann, Rafael La Porta, and others, research on institutions has been 
booming. In general, there has been an agreement among researchers that good 
institutions have positive effect on economic performance. Institutions are very 
important for growth and prosperity because they “provide the incentive structure of an 
economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards 
growth, stagnation or decline” (North, 1991, p.112). According to institutional 
economists, it is the differences in institutions that finally lead to differences in 
economic performance across countries. Institutions are even considered more 
important than such factors as geography and economic integration. In Rodrik et al.’s 
words (2004), “institutions rule”. Institutions affect allocation of resources, the 
effectiveness of the use of resource and, as a result, economic growth. The incentive 
structure shaped by institutions determines if resources are allocated to production or 
rent-seeking activities and how effectively resources are used to produce goods and 
services. Poor institutions are found to divert investment, thus limiting accumulation of 
capital and growth (Mauro, 1995). Besides, poor institutions are found to reduce 
productivity growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Olson et al., 2000; Meon and Weil, 2005). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that institutions are found to have a significant effect on 
growth even when investment is controlled for (Knack and Keefer, 1995). While 




institutions can be endogenous, rigorous studies have shown that institutions indeed can 
explain growth when endogeneity is accounted for (Acemoglu et al., 2001) and at least 
some aspects of institutions Granger-cause growth (Dawson, 2003).   
 Following the collapse of the Socialist System that spanned much of the 
Eurasian continent, the world has seen great transformations in the former socialist 
countries as they move from a planned economic system to a market-based one. They 
all head to a common ultimate objective of a well-functioning market economy but 
transition measures taken are very different. While many Eastern European transition 
countries have adopted a big-bang approach of various extents, their Asian counterparts 
have implemented gradual reform steps. Their economic achievements have been 
widely different too. There are countries like China and Vietnam that have achieved 
continuous growth at high rates. Others have quickly stabilized their economies and 
attained growth after an initial output fall (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech 
Republic). In contrast, some of them, especially the former Soviet republics, had to 
struggle hard for years before they could get back to the pre-transition level of output.  
The experience of transition economies has been a natural economic experiment 
that attracted a lot of attention from economic researchers around the world (Blanchard 
et al., 1991, McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1994; Aslund et al., 1996; 
De Melo et al., 1996; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; Falcetti et al., 2000; etc.). Initially, 
researches tended to focus on the reform strategies and the transition literature centred 
on the shock therapy vis-à-vis the gradualism debate. On one hand, the proponents of 
the shock therapy argued for a quick and simultaneous reform in all socio-economic 
areas while the political window of opportunity is still open (Sachs and Woo, 1994; 
Woo, 1994). On the other hand, others proposed a more gradualist approach on the 




ground of necessary phasing of reforms, the lower cost to the budget and the lower risk 
of macroeconomic instability due to rapid restructuring (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; 
Dewatripont and Roland, 1992).  
In general, institutions were ignored in the early literature on transition for 
different reasons. Institutions were sometimes considered to be less important than other 
transition issues (Blanchard et al., 1991) or to take too long to establish so that other 
policies would be prioritized (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). Following the poor performance 
of East European transition economies in the 1990s researchers turned their attention to 
institutions in a search for explanations for the disappointing performance of these 
many transition economies and the marked differences in economic outcome between 
them (Fidrmuc, 2003; Havrylyshyn and Rooden, 2003; Murrell, 2006; Beck and 
Laeven, 2006). 
In this context, this thesis attempts to further analyze the role of institutions in 
the context of transition economies in three directions as follows: 
First, efficiency is one of the mortal weaknesses of the former socialist 
countries. For many transition economies factor accumulation was not a big problem 
but low efficiency really was. Therefore, the first question this thesis tries to answer is: 
how do institutions, in the sense of economic and political freedom, affect efficiency of 
transition economies? 
Second, investment is one of the key determinants of growth which survives 
rigorous sensitivity analysis (Levine and Renelt, 1992). For the transition process to 
achieve expected results transition countries need to scrap obsolete capital and replace it 
with new investment that is in line with a market-based production system. Different 
countries with different institutional quality, business environment and policies should 




attain different investment rates. Thus, the second question this thesis attempts to 
provide answers for is: how do economic freedom, political freedom and liberalization 
affect investment rates in transition countries? 
The third question raised in the thesis is about how differences in property rights 
impact behaviour of banks in terms of credit supply. Managers of privately owned and 
publicly owned banks, or any other firms, have different incentive structures. Banks of 
different ownership also have different clienteles and ability and willingness to enforce 
contracts. These differences should have effect on various aspects of banks’ operation, 
including lending, and consequently on the economy as a whole. To address this issue, 
we focus on a country which, while not strictly undergoing a transformation from 
central planning to a market economy, has features very similar to those of transition 
countries. Since early 1990s, the Indian economy has been undergoing reforms with 
liberalization and privatization measures similar to those observed in the former 
socialist countries. In many countries, including transition ones, banks still play the 
central role of channelling savings to investment (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001) 
and generating financial resources for the transition process. Banks of different 
ownership types may act differently in terms of loan supply, which would have different 
impacts on the real economy. Understanding behaviours of banks of different ownership 
types would help to calibrate more appropriate monetary policies towards a more stable 
macroeconomic environment and better access to funding for firms during the transition 
process.  
2.  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic of the thesis and the 
motivations of the research. The next section of Chapter I will present the concept and 




measures of institutions that have been used in the literature and in this thesis, followed 
by a brief survey of the related literature as a background for the thesis, a section on 
research methodologies employed in the analytical chapters and finally a section on the 
key findings of the thesis.  
Chapter II studies the effect of institutions on efficiency of transition economies. 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is used to estimate efficiency scores for 30 transition 
countries and estimate the effect of institutions on efficiency. One problem inherent in 
this analysis is the lack of reliable data on capital stock in the transition economies. 
Therefore, the perpetual inventory method (PIM) is used to construct capital series used 
in the efficiency analysis. Measures of both political and economic institutions are used. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to select indicators that best represent 
the underlying institutional indicators for econometrical analysis. Economic and 
political freedoms are found to have positive effects on efficiency of transition 
economies.  
Chapter III analyzes the effect of institutions on investment rates in transition 
economies by way of panel data methodology. The chapter centres on a comprehensive 
model of investment with a focus on institutional determinants of investment. Measures 
of institutions include economic freedom, political freedom and liberalization index. 
Principal components of economic freedoms are also employed together with individual 
indicators of economic institutions and liberalization. The chapter concludes by 
identifying the main factors determining investment rates in transition economies.  
Chapter IV is an empirical analysis of effect of ownership on bank lending as a 
channel of monetary transmission in India. Since the early 1990s, India has liberalized 
its economy substantially and achieved admirable economic growth. The Indian 




banking sector plays a very important role in this success and there have been some 
radical reforms with privatization and liberalization measures. In this chapter, a 
monetary conditions index (MCI) is used to highlight the asymmetry of the bank 
lending with respect to monetary policies. Interactions of bank ownership types, MCI 
and monetary policy are used to show the differences in the reaction of each bank type 
to changes in monetary policy in terms of lending. 
The last chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of the findings and 
remarks on institutions and economic development in transition countries.  
3.   INSTITUTION – CONCEPT AND MEASURES 
3.1.  The concept  
In the economic literature, there have been several approaches to the question 
what institutions are and these are succinctly by Crawford and Ostrom (1995). 
According to the authors, there are three approaches to answer the question. One 
approach considers institutions as regularities in the behaviour of social agents or 
equilibrium outcomes which arise from human interactions on the basis of rational 
behaviours. This approach was first pioneered by Friedrich von Hayek and then further 
discussed by Schotter (1981) and Riker (1980). Though this approach can depict 
regularities in the behaviours of agents that result from shared understandings about the 
appropriate actions for a particular situation it does not distinguish the roots of actions 
which may be voluntary or imposed and enforced by external forces. The second 
approach considers institutions as norms with an assumption that many patterns of 
behaviours are based on people’s shared perceptions about what is proper and what is 
not in particular contexts. In this view, one needs to go beyond rationality to understand 




human behaviours. The third popular approach views institutions as rules. This 
approach has been advanced by various works by Douglas North (1990, 1991), Olivier 
E. Williamson (1985), Elinor Ostrom (1986) and Jack Knight (1992). This institutional 
theory considers patterns of behaviours as necessary or required actions because non-
compliant actions are likely to be sanctioned or rendered ineffective by authorities.  
According to Crawford and Ostrom (1995), these three approaches are not 
mutually exclusive. They all try to explain social orders on individualistic and 
situational foundations. They all point to shared strategies and expectations that 
influence behaviours and involve constraints and opportunities. The first two 
approaches are very helpful for understanding the evolution and emergence of social 
orders or regularities of behaviours that emerge gradually over a long period of time. 
They lend themselves mostly to informal institutions which include customs, traditions, 
taboos, stigmas, etc.). However, there are social and political changes that quickly bring 
about new rules that involve new constraints and opportunities, shaping agents 
behaviour accordingly. These rules, constraints and opportunities are often referred to as 
formal institutions. Examples of formal institutions include constitutions and laws. This 
approach is specially relevant to the discussion about the role of the state in promoting 
(or hindering) economic growth and development and relationship between the state and 
the market. Therefore, in the context of this study about transition economies where 
markets are being built to cater for economic activities that reach far beyond community 
boundaries we choose to follow the third approach about institutions to focus on formal 
rules, constraints and opportunities. In addition, this approach is also widely adopted 
due to the fact that it is much easier to quantify and compare formal institutions with 
several dataset on institutional quality available for empirical explorations. 




In this regard, institutions are referred to as “the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991, p.97).  Here, 
constraints are referred to as reference framework for actions rather than limitations on 
actions. These constraints are created to facilitate (or impede) economic exchanges and 
they form the incentive structure of an economy which in turn shapes the direction of 
economic change.  
In general, this approach to institutions is widely subscribed to. Aron (2000), in 
a wide-ranging review of literature on institutions, and Acemoglu et al. (2004), also use 
North’s definition. Rodrik (2000), summarising other economists, defines institutions as 
“a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and shape the interactions of 
human beings, in part by helping them to form expectations of what others will do” 
which is the same in nature as the North’s definition.  
According to their views, of primary importance to economic performance are 
the economic institutions that influence the incentive structure in a society such as the 
structure of property rights and the presence and orderly functioning of markets. 
Without institutions human actions become very uncertain and economic exchange and 
cooperation can be subject to such high costs and risks that markets cannot be 
established, exchanges cannot be carried out and production potential cannot be 
realized. According to North and other institutional economists, institutions reduce 
uncertainty, facilitate economic exchange and thus play a major role in explaining 
economic performance across countries.  
3.2.  Measures 
In the last two decades the literature on institutions has expanded enormously 
thanks to great efforts to quantify different aspects of institutions.  The common 




approach to quantify institutions is to measure the level of freedom to conduct 
exchanges and protection against arbitrary violation of property rights. Freedom is a 
concept that is complementary to “constraints” and “rules” which are central to North’s 
and Rodrik’s definitions of institutions. In this direction, several panel databases have 
been constructed that enable empirical analysis and comparison across country and over 
time. In terms of economic institutions, there are the Economic Freedom Index1 (the 
Fraser Institute Index) available from the Fraser Institute and the Index of Economic 
Freedom2 (the Heritage Foundation Index) which is compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal. With regard to political freedom we have the 
Freedom Index by the Freedom House3, the Polity Project data by the Center for 
Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy4, George Mason University, and the 
Governance Indicators5
The Fraser Institute Index and Heritage Foundation Index are very similar and 
they are highly correlated. For 21 transition countries over 6 years the correlation 
coefficient of the two measures is 0.83 (see Chapter 2). However, the Fraser Institute 
Index covers only 21 transition countries
 by the World Bank. For transition countries, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) compiles a liberalization index which is 
also a measure of institutions since it reflects the level of control of the economy by 
private hands transferred from the state in the former socialist countries. These datasets 
often entail individual sub-indicators that measure different aspects of economic or 
political institutions.  
6
                                                 
1 Gwartney et al., 2008. 
 and before 2000 it was only available for 
2 Holmes et al., 2008. 
3 www.freedomhouse.org.  
4 Marshall and Jaggers, 2009.  
5 Kaufmann et al., 2008. 
6 18 Central and Eastern European countries and three East Asian countries. 




every five years while the Heritage Foundation Index covers all transition countries 
with yearly data starting in 1995. For this reason, the Heritage Foundation Index is used 
as an indicator of quality of economic institutions in chapter II and chapter III of this 
thesis. The EBRD liberalization index is also used for a smaller panel of transition 
countries for which the index is available.  
In addition to economic freedom, the Freedom House’s Political Rights (PR) 
and Civil Liberties (CL) are also used to analyze the impact of political institutions on 
economic performance (chapter II) and investment rates (chapter III). Basically, these 
measures of institutions are selected on the basis of coverage and availability for 
transition countries.  
There have been several criticisms about the existing measures of institutions 
and the empirical studies that use aggregate indexes. Concerning the Fraser Institute 
Index, according to Berggren (2003), “it should be noted that the components of the 
EFI, as well as weighting schemes, have changed in the various editions that have been 
published” (pp.194-195). Heckelman and Stroup (2005) also observe that the weights of 
the various elements of the aggregate index do not appropriately reflect the magnitude 
or even the direction of each individual element’s marginal impact on growth. In fact, 
they found that some elements of the EFI had a statistically significant negative impact 
on growth. The issue of aggregation can be dealt with by the PCA but it is not without 
caveat in the sense that there is no theoretical linkage between the components and the 
variables to be explained. In this thesis, together with individual elements of institutions 
and simple averages of them, the PCA is also used to link the components with the 
dependent variables of interest.  




Another criticism is that these variables are not indicators of institutional quality 
because institutions do not change that much. However, there are different types or 
layers of institutions. According to Douglas North, there are formal (e.g., rules, laws, 
constitutions) and informal (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes 
of conduct) institutions. According to Williamson (2000) there are four levels of 
institutions. The first level is social imbeddedness which mainly corresponds to 
informal constraints and where institutions change very slowly. At higher levels, 
institutions include formal rules, polity, judiciary, bureaucracy and governance, which 
may be considered as formal institutions. At these levels, institutions can change 
relatively quickly in the order of years or tens of years. Indeed, when assessing the 
institutional development of transition economies, Murrell (2003) shows that the 
transition economies have achieved institutional quality higher than often thought and 
the success is due to better formal institutions, not informal ones. Though not fully 
indicative of the quality of institutions of all types and levels the current measures of 
institutions as listed above are widely viewed as appropriate for empirical analysis of 
the effect of institutions on various economic variables. Of course, these measures of 
institutions are always subject to some level of subjectivity and imprecision due to the 
fact that the concepts of economic and political freedom refer to quality rather than 
quantity. 
4.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1.  The institutions-growth relationship 
Though the importance of institutions has been highlighted for a very long time 
the literature on institution-growth relationship did not really take off until the 1990s. 




The main reason was the lack of data for empirical tests. Another reason is that despite 
many models to explain growth differences there were many puzzles when institutions 
are not accounted for. Hall and Jones (1999) find that variations in the Solow residuals 
among countries can be explained by social infrastructure which includes institutions. 
When surveying empirical studies on growth, Easterly and Levine (2001) mention that 
it is not factor accumulation that determines the bulk of cross-country growth 
differences but something else. De Melo et al. (2001) and Falcetti et al. (2002) observe 
that differences in application of standard policies do not explain differences in 
economic performance. There must be something else. One of the first attempts to relate 
institutions to growth is the paper by Barro (1991) which shows that growth rate is 
positively associated with political stability and inversely related to market distortions. 
Then, Knack and Keefer (1995) show that the impact of governance on growth remains 
significant even when investment is controlled for in growth equations. On the effect of 
corruption, Mauro (1995) finds that corruption is negatively associated with investment 
and growth. Dawson (1998) finds that free market institutions have positive effects on 
growth through total factor productivity directly and investment indirectly. In another 
attempt to estimate the effect of institutions, especially democracy, on growth Rodrik 
(2000) uses data of 90 countries over the 1970-1989 and finds that a higher level of 
democracy is associated with a smaller variance of long-run growth. In the context of 
transition economies, Fidrmuc (2003) shows that democracy has positive effect on 
growth though its effect on liberalization.  
However, there have been doubts about these empirical results on the ground of 
measurement of institutions and possible endogeneity of institutions. Concerned with 
the measurement of institutions, De Haan and Sturm (2000) construct a new index of 




economic freedom with a new mix of components of the Fraser Institute Economic 
Freedom Index and their empirical result shows that the change in the economic 
freedom (not the level) is a significant determinant of growth. This result is robust to an 
extreme bound analysis and a distributional analysis (for coefficients of institutions). In 
response to the question about endogeneity of institutional variables, Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) exploit the mortality rates of early European settlers in their colonies as an 
instrument for institutions and they find that improvement of institutions (like reducing 
expropriation risk) would result in higher per capital income. In a similar attempt, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use colonial characteristics (legal origin, mortality rate 
and population density) as instrument variables for institutional variables (protection of 
property rights and contracting institution). Their result shows that property rights 
institutions have direct effect on long-run growth, investment and financial development 
while contracting institutions seem to affect only financial intermediation. To produce a 
clear-cut result on the relationship between institutions and growth, Dawson (2003) 
tests for a Granger causal relationship between the two variables and shows that some 
aspects of economic freedom Granger-cause growth while some others are Granger-
caused by growth or jointly determined with growth. Generally speaking, there seems to 
be a consensus among researchers of the field that institutions of high quality are 
definitely good for economic growth.  
4.2.  The effect of institutions on investment and efficiency 
Concerning efficiency the most notable work is Adkins et al. (2002) who use a 
panel of more than 70 countries over the period 1975-1990 and stochastic frontier 
analysis to show that increase in economic freedom (Fraser Institute Index) leads to 
higher efficiency. In an attempt to test the relationship between governance, as reported 




in Kaufmann et al. (1999), and technical efficiency, Meon and Weill (2005) find that for 
a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance, especially government efficiency, is 
associated with greater technical efficiency. Though literature on transition has 
expanded to a great extent and the transition process has been going on for almost two 
decades the efficiency of former socialist countries has not been studied properly, 
especially with effect of institutions. Therefore this thesis will try to add to the literature 
in this direction.  
The effect of institutions on investment has received more attention from 
researchers. In general, the existing results postulate a positive effect of institutions on 
investment. Acemoglu (1995) shows that rent-seeking reduces marginal productivity of 
investment and that  rent-seeking has increasing return to scale which makes rent-
seeking relatively more attractive compared to investment in production. Mauro (1995) 
shows that corruption hurts both growth and investment. More seriously, corruption 
makes investment less efficient. In public sector corruption may shift public investment 
away from the most profitable projects to less profitable ones that offer more 
opportunities for corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In addition, bad governance 
reduces the incentive to invest in R&D (Meon and Weil, 2005), thus limiting 
opportunities to improve efficiency. As a strong evidence for the positive effect of 
institutions, Dawson (1998) empirically shows that political and civil liberties stimulate 
investment in a cross section of 85 countries. However, works in this field study broad 
cross sections or panels of countries that do not cover transition economies. To our best 
knowledge, the literature on investment in transition countries is focused on firms’ 
investment constraints and behaviour (e.g., Budina et al., 2000; Konings et al., 2003; 
Mueller and Peev, 2007). None has tried to analyze determinants of investment rates for 




the whole group of transition countries. Another purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap 
in literature on transition economies. Since institutions are theoretically proposed and 
empirically found to be a very important determinant of growth and development, we 
are particularly interested in examining the role of institutions and reform policies in 
explaining investment difference among transition economies. 
4.3.  On the relationship between ownership and bank lending 
According to La Porta et al. (2000), state-ownership of banks is ubiquitous in 
much of the world, especially in emerging markets. There are several arguments for and 
against state ownership of banks. State ownership of banks can serve a social objective 
of allocating funds to projects with high social returns (Stiglitz et al., 1993). Given the 
socially desirable objective, however, managers of state-owned banks may not have the 
right incentives (Tirole, 1994), thus exerting less effort and allocating resources 
inefficiently. In addition, state-owned banks can be used as a tool for politicians to win 
support from political followers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) in pursuit of their own 
individual interests. Studying lending records of one state-owned bank in India, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2001) shows that this bank does not adjust credit limit to optimal 
level over time or according to customers’ needs though the needs often change over 
time. Micco and Panizza (2006) report that public banks, especially those in developing 
countries, play a credit-smoothing role by lending anti-cyclically. However, Bhaumik 
and Piesse (2007) find that lending of private banks is more persistent than that of 
public banks. Entry of foreign banks also creates different effects on domestic credit 
markets. In the context of a Latin American country - Argentina, Berger et al. (2001) 
shows that foreign banks disburse less credit to informationally opaque and small firms. 
However, also in Argentina, Clarke et al. (2005) shows that increased foreign 




ownership coincides with more lending outside of Buenos Aires. With regard to foreign 
bank entry in transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Haas and Lelyveld 
(2005) find that foreign banks help stabilize domestic credit by maintaining credit base 
during recession while domestic banks reduce their credit supply. So, there is large 
heterogeneity in terms of credit supply by banks of different ownership, depending on 
the context of study. India is in a process of privatizing and liberalizing its banking 
system in which state-owned banks, domestic banks and foreign banks coexist and 
compete on relatively equal terms (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2007). Therefore, India can be 
a good case for studying the effect of ownership on bank lending as a channel of 
monetary transmission.  
5.  METHODOLOGY 
5.1.  Institutions and efficiency (chapter II) 
First, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which was independently 
developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977) is used to measure the efficiency of the economies in question. Another popular 
method to measure efficiency is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Although there 
has been an on-going debate on which method is superior, the SFA is thought to 
outperform the DEA in efficiency study for transition countries where measurement 
problem and uncertainty in the economic environment are prevalent (Fries and Taci, 
2005). To estimate the effect of institutions on efficiency, stochastic frontier and the 
inefficiency function are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood as proposed 
by Battese and Coelli (1995). The capital series used in the frontier estimation is 
calculated from flows of physical capital by the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). 




Two indicators of economic institutions are the first two principal components extracted 
from the PCA of ten economic freedoms (the Heritage Foundation).  
5.2.  Institutions and investment rates (chapter III) 
In chapter III panel data methods are used to estimate the effect of institutions on 
investment rates of transition economies. A panel model is built on the basis of the 
theoretical and empirically tested relationship between institutions and other 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable – investment rate. The possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable is controlled for by tests (similar to the 
Hausman test) and use of lagged variables. Both aggregate and individual indicators of 
institutions are used to have a broader view about the role of overall institutions and 
those of different areas. 
5.3.  Ownership and bank lending in India (chapter IV) 
Panel data analysis is also used in Chapter IV where the most important 
methodological innovation is the use of the interaction of monetary regime type and 
ownership type and monetary policy indicator to detect the different effects of monetary 
policy on bank lending of different ownership-based bank groups. Lag of monetary 
policy variable is used to avoid feedback from dependent variable to independent 
variable. Robust fixed effect panel estimation method is applied to obtain coefficients of 
interest.  
6.  KEY FINDINGS 
The main finding of chapter II is that higher quality of institutions, both 
economic and political, is associated with higher efficiency in transition economies. 
This result is robust to different rates of depreciation that are used to estimate the capital 




series for these countries. All else being equal, East Asian transition countries have 
higher efficiency than other transition counterparts in Europe and Central Asia. This 
chapter also shows that for transition economies the translog production function is 
more appropriate for estimating efficiency than the usual Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
Chapter III finds that political and economic freedoms significantly determine 
investment rates in transition economies. Higher freedoms induce more investment, thus 
generating indirect positive effect on growth. However, it is the overall improvement in 
economic institutions, not in individual aspects, that matters. The study also shows that 
higher level of financial development and savings rate help increase investment in 
transition economies.  
In chapter IV the empirical analysis shows that banks’ loan supply is 
asymmetric in the sense that, for some bank groups (public and foreign-owned), it is 
significantly cut down in a tight monetary regime but not so in an easy regime. In 
addition, banks of different types respond very differently to monetary policies in 
different monetary regimes. In a tight monetary regime, public and foreign banks cut 
back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to be 
affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they 
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of 
monetary tightening. In other words, ownership makes a difference in terms of loan 
supply by banks for a given monetary policy and monetary condition and the ownership 
structure of the banking system plays a role in determining the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in an economy that is a process of transition from a public-dominated 
system to a more liberalized and competitive system.  
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 CHAPTER II - INSTITUTIONS AND EFFICIENCY IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The significant role of institutions in determining growth has been confirmed in 
many studies. Barro (1991) shows that growth rate is positively associated with political 
stability and inversely related to a proxy7
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effect of institutions on 
efficiency in the context of transition economies. Since the fall of the socialist system, 
transition countries have undergone a transformation process from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-based economic system. We have observed marked difference in 
economic performance of these economies. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, almost 
all of transition countries experienced sharp output fall in the early 1990s and then went 
through a recovery process with positive growth rates. At the same time in East Asia 
China, Vietnam and Cambodia managed to grow at high and steady rates.  
 of market distortions. Mauro (1995) concludes 
that bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and growth. Rodrik’s (2000) study 
on 90 countries over 1970-1989 leads to a conclusion that the more democratic a 
country is the smaller the variance of its long run growth. In addition, the effect of 
institutions on growth is not just to promote capital accumulation as Knack and Keefer 
(1995) reveal that it is still significant after controlling for factor accumulation and 
policy. This suggests that institutions should be an important determinant of efficiency. 
While factor accumulation certainly plays an important part in explaining 
growth efficiency also matters a lot. In fact, as shown by Easterly and Levine (2001), 
productivity rather than factor accumulation explain most of the differences in income 
                                                 
7 The deviation from the sample mean of the purchasing power parity for investment in 1960. 
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and growth among countries. For many transition countries the problem is more about 
utilizing existing factors efficiently than about accumulating them. We can say that they 
have been operating below the production possibility frontier (PPF) and it will take 
them a while to get to the level of efficiency attained in advanced economies. Moreover, 
due to differences in initial conditions, the speed of transition and socio-economic 
settings, we can expect large variation in efficiency level of these countries. 
During the transition process, different institutional settings, both political and 
economic, have emerged in these countries. As noted in Murrell (2003), institutional 
quality in transition economies in general has improved quickly. However, there is a 
huge divergence in the levels of institutional development. Kaufmann et al. (2005) 
show that countries like Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have institutional quality 
that is in many aspects comparable to those of developed countries while other countries 
continue to lag far behind. Therefore, the experience of transition countries in terms of 
recovering from a disrupted system and building necessary institutions for a market 
economy can be viewed as something close to a natural experiment for analyzing the 
effect of institutions on growth in general and improvement in efficiency in particular. 
Theoretically, there are many channels through which institutions can affect 
economic growth and efficiency. Democratic regimes with check and balance 
mechanisms are better able to curb corruption and prevent misuse of productive 
resources, especially in investment activities involving public funds, which is good for 
growth and efficiency. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when 
democratic norms and institutions are stronger. In an effort to explain corruption 
Treisman (2000) also concludes that democracy reduces corruption though it is well 
established democracy rather than recent democratization process that matters (Sung 
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(2004) also comes to similar conclusion). Good institutions can encourage accumulation 
of physical capital, human capital and technological knowledge and these factors in turn 
help improve efficiency. Bevan et al. (2004) finds that development of legal institutions 
has positive effect on FDI inflows to transition countries in Europe, which is supposed 
to bring in more advanced technologies to local economies and help enhance their 
efficiency. In addition, economic freedom is found by Dawson (1998), among others, to 
affect growth directly via total factor productivity and indirectly through investment. 
Though there have been many studies on the relationship between institutions 
and growth, there are very few attempts to relate efficiency to institutions, especially in 
the transition context. Monorey and Lovell (1997) compare the efficiency of 17 Western 
European market economies and that of 7 Eastern European planned economies. With a 
dummy variable to identify planned economies, their research shows that over the 
period 1978-1980 the Eastern European planned economies were only about three 
fourths as efficient as the Western European market economies. Using a panel of more 
than 70 countries over the period 1975-1990, economic freedom measures compiled by 
Gwartney et al. (2005) and stochastic frontier analysis, Adkins et al. (2002) show that 
increase in economic freedom leads to higher efficiency. However, two measures of 
political freedom, namely civil liberties and political rights taken from the Freedom 
House Index, are not significant in their model. In an attempt to test the relationship 
between governance, as reported in Kaufmann et al. (1999), and technical efficiency, 
Meon and Weill (2005) find that for a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance, 
especially government efficiency, is associated with greater technical efficiency.  
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research that digs into the 
relationship between institution and efficiency in transition economies since the 
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collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Perhaps it is because of the lack of data about institutions, 
capital and labour in these countries.  One of the contributions of this study is to 
estimate capital series for these countries from gross investment data using the 
Perpetual Inventory Method. Then, following Battese and Coelli (1995), Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) is used to estimate the efficiency and effect of institutions on 
efficiency at the same time by maximum likelihood technique. 
The next section presents stochastic frontier analysis and the specification of the 
production and efficiency functions. It will be followed by description of data in Section 
3 and empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 will conclude the chapter.  
2.  THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS AND THE MODELLING OF 
EFFICIENCY  
2.1.  Stochastic frontier model 
There are several methods to measure efficiency and the most popular two are 
the SFA and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Although there has been an on-
going debate on which method is superior the SFA is supposed to outperform the DEA 
in efficiency study for transition countries where measurement problem and uncertainty 
in the economic environment are prevalent (Fries and Taci, 2005). 
The stochastic frontier production function was independently developed by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Many 
researchers have used the model to estimate technical inefficiency for comparing 
efficiencies of firms or economies. Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of 
observed output over the maximum feasible output (the frontier) given the level of 
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inputs. For a panel data analysis with i as producer identifier and t as time period, the 
technical efficiency is depicted as: 
 








= ≤   (2.1)       
In equation (1), itx is a (1 x k) vector of inputs, β is a (k x 1) vector of 
coefficients to be estimated; itv  is random error that are assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed as 2(0, )vN σ . The vit is the stochastic element of the 
production function that captures random shocks to each producer/country. So the 
production frontier model will look like:  
 ( ) ( ); .exp .it it it ity f x v TEβ=  (2.2) 
Let exp( )it itTE u= − and assume that ( );itf x β takes the log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
form the stochastic production frontier model becomes  
 ,ln lnit o k k it it it
k
y x v uβ β= + + −∑  (2.3) 
In equation (1.3) uit is the measure of inefficiency because the higher the uit the 
lower the TEit. Equation (1.3) is a linear regression model with a composite error 
it it itv uε = − where vit is the two-sided stochastic error and uit is the nonnegative 
inefficiency term. Because 1itTE ≤  we have uit≥0 and the composite error itε is 
asymmetric. Therefore, OLS estimation cannot provide a consistent estimate of 0β . 
Moreover, OLS cannot provide estimates of uit which are central to efficiency analyses. 
In the standard efficiency literature, the frontier equation is estimated by maximum 
likelihood techniques with assumptions about distribution of vit and uit and uit are 
extracted from the composite error. 
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Early attempts (Pitt and Lee, 1981 and Kalirajan and Shand, 1986) to explain 
efficiency effects adopt two-stage approach, in which efficiency scores are estimated in 
the first stage and then regressed against some explanatory variables in the second. 
However, the assumption of identical distribution of uit in the first stage is violated in 
the second stage which is usually OLS estimation. Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a 
model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier function for panel data. 
The stochastic frontier and the inefficiency function are estimated simultaneously by 
maximum likelihood. The panel specification of the model is as follows: 
                                     it it it ity x v uβ= + −                                                                    (2.4)  
where with i = 1, …, N and t =1, …, T; ity is the logarithm of the output for country i in 
period t, itx is a vector of inputs (in log), and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. vit is assumed to be i.i.d N(0, σv2) random error and distributed 
independently of uit. Technical inefficiency uit is a non-negative random variable 
assumed to be independently distributed such that uit is obtained by truncation (at zero) 
of the normal distribution 2( , )it uN z δ σ . In another word, the technical inefficiency effect 
uit is modelled as: 
   it it itu z wδ= +       (2.5) 
where the random error wit is assumed to follow normal distribution N(0,σ2) truncated at 
such a point that itu ≥0; the itz is a vector of explanatory variables associated with 
technical inefficiency andδ is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.  
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s coefficients is facilitated by 
Battese and Corra (1977) parameterization, 2 2 2v uσ σ σ= +  and 
2 2 2/( )u v uγ σ σ σ= +  and 
they are estimated by the software Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). σ2 is the sum of variances 
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of the stochastic error and the inefficiency term and γ is the ratio of variance of the 
inefficiency term over the total variance. If γ is significant we can say that the 
inefficiency matters and we can model the inefficiency. 
2.2.  Specification of production function and modelling of efficiency 
In stochastic frontier analysis, specification of production function is important 
because efficiency is measured against an estimated frontier. If the frontier function is 
miss-specified the conclusion about the dynamics or determination of efficiency may be 
wrong. The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in the literature on 
economic growth. However, there have been several studies which test the validity of 
the Cobb-Douglas specification. Based on a panel of 82 countries over a 28-year period, 
Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that Cobb-Douglas can be rejected in favour of a 
more general CES specification. In theory, Cobb-Douglas is not as good as translog 
function since translog is a good first order approximation of many different types of 
functions with Cobb-Douglas as a special case. In another attempt to examine Cobb-
Douglas specification with the presence of technical inefficiency with the same data set 
as the above, Kneller and Stevens (2003) also rejects Cobb-Douglas vis-à-vis the 
translog function.  
In this chapter, we will also estimate the production frontier with both translog 
and Cobb-Douglas technologies. The production frontier equations are: 
(i) Cobb-Douglas: 0 1 2 3it it it it ity k l t v uβ β β β= + + + + −    (2.6) 
(ii) Translog: 2 20 1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it it it ity k l k l k l t v uβ β β β β β β= + + + + + + + −  (2.7) 
Here, ity is the logarithm of output for country i at time t, k is the logarithm of 
capital stock and l is the logarithm of labour. The time trend (t) is added to account for 
movement in the frontier (Kneller and Stevens, 2003). 
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To examine the effect of institutions on efficiency, the inefficiency term itu is 
modelled as a function of the degree of economic freedom as proxied by the Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF), which is developed by the Heritage Foundation, and levels of 
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) published by the Freedom House. The 
average value of PR and CL is collectively called Freedom House Index (FHI) .To 
account for systematic changes of efficiency over time, a time trend is also added to 
efficiency effect model. Time trend has been found significant in some efficiency 
analyses (see Kneller and Stevens (2003) for example).  
Svejnar (2002) observes that the Central and Eastern and European countries 
had smaller output declines and could reverse the decline earlier than the countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, Eastern Asian transition 
economies did not suffer from recession and have had high growth rates. It seems there 
are regional characteristics that should be picked up by regional dummies. Therefore, 
three dummies are generated and added to the efficiency model to account for potential 
region-specific effects for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and East Asia (EA)8
0 1 2 3 4it it it i itu IEF FHI RD time wδ δ δ δ δ= + + + + +
. In general, the technical efficiency 
function will look like this: 
    (2.8) 
with RDi being dummies for CEE, CIS or EA. 
3.  DATA  
This research uses a panel of 28 transition economies over the 1995-2005 
period. The selection of countries and time period is mainly on the basis of data 
                                                 
8 CIS countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. 
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availability. 1995 is the year when the Index of Economic Freedom data was first 
available. Two types of data that need detailing are input-output data and measures of 
institutions. 
3.1.  Input-output data 
The growth and efficiency literature usually uses either the World Bank’s 
STARS dataset9
Since capital stock data are not available for all countries in the sample in any 
existing databases, the transition countries’ investment series (gross capital formation) 
are used to construct capital series by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method. 
According to the method, the capital stock evolves as follows: 
 or Summers and Heston’s dataset (Penn World Table). However, these 
datasets do not include all transition countries. So for the purpose of this research we 
use the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDIs) for output (GDP), gross 
investment and labour. Output is total GDP converted to 2000 constant US dollar at 
official exchange rate. The data on labour is the total labour force in the relevant 
countries. 
1(1 )t t tK I Kδ −= + − ,      (2.9) 
with δ being the depreciation rate of capital. 








,      (2.10) 
where g is the growth rate of the capital stock which is assumed to be equal the average 
of GDP growth rates over the estimation period.  
                                                 
9 It is developed by two World Bank researchers V. Nehru and A. Dhareshwar (1993). 
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 Selecting the correct depreciation rate δ in calculating capital stocks is very 
important. If the rate is too high capital accumulation will be low and productivity 
growth will be overestimated and vice versa. In the growth literature one depreciation 
rate is often applied across the whole sample of countries, be they developed or 
developing countries (4% in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and 7% in Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993)). However, depreciation rates applied to developed and developing 
countries should be different because investment projects in developing countries are 
normally not as efficient as those in developed countries. That is not to mention 
corruption which is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed ones. 
Bu (2006) estimates depreciation rates from firm level data of some developing 
countries and finds them to be much higher than rates used in the above-cited growth 
and efficiency analyses. Pritchett (2000) reports that over half of developing countries 
in the sample under investigation have negative total factor productivity. One possible 
explanation could be the overvaluation of capital which is equivalent to low 
depreciation rate. Therefore, in this chapter the capital series are generated with a 
depreciation rate δ =10%10.  Unfortunately, we are unable to compare our capital series 
with existing ones because they are only available for pre-1990 periods11
3.2.  Measures of institutions 
 and we do not 
have investment series for most of transition countries (all but China and Hungary) to 
estimate capital stock for the pre-1990 period. 
 Many researchers of institutional economics use the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom Index constructed by James D. Gwartney, Robert A. Lawson and J. R. Clark 
                                                 
10 For robustness check 6% depreciation rate is also used to generate another capital series but the main 
estimation results do not change (see Table  A.3). 
11 1950-1988 in Penn World Table  5.6 (capital series not available in later version) and 1950-1990 in 
World Bank dataset. 
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(Gwartney et al., 1999). However, this dataset does not cover all transition countries12 
and before 2000 it was only available for every five years. In this study I use the Index 
of Economic Freedom data developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal. In fact, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom are highly correlated with a coefficient of 
0.813
The IEF dataset starts from 1995 and is available for all transition countries. The 
authors of the Index collect 50 independent economic variables that are categorized into 
ten economic freedom factors (IFE factors): trade policy, fiscal burden or government, 
government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, 
banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and informal market. 
The difference between this data set and others is that the values of the variables are 
calculated with data available from various sources
 for transition countries that have both measures of economic freedom. 
14
So far, many institution researchers have used the composite indexes such as the 
index of governance published by Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors, the Gwartney et 
al.’s Economic Freedom Index (Fraser Institute) or the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom in their empirical researches but there have been doubts about their 
consistency and relevance. Berggren (2003) observes that the Gwartney et al.’s index 
has different components and is constructed with different weighting schemes from one 
 which are less subject to 
subjective survey data. Each factor is graded from 1 to 5, with a score of 1 representing 
an economic environment that is the most conducive to economic freedom. Table 2.1 in 
the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of these ten factors. In general the 
correlation between them is of a considerable level.  
                                                 
12 only 21 transition countries (19 Central and Eastern  European countries and two East Asian countries). 
13 Note that for the Fraser Institute’s index, the higher the score the more freedom there is. 
14 See Beach and Miles (2006) for details. 
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year to another. Heckelman and Stroup (2005) suggest that empirical researchers should 
use individual economic freedom indicators instead of the aggregate indexes because 
misinterpretation may arise with regard to different types of economic freedom. 
 
Table 2.1 
Correlations of Indices of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) 
 Trade Fiscal Gov_int Mon_pol For_inv Banking WP PROP REG 
Trade 1         
Fiscal 0.2402 1        
Gov_int 0.4318 0.2383 1       
Mon_pol 0.1572 0.2839 0.377 1      
For_inv 0.5549 0.2203 0.3653 0.1128 1     
Banking 0.5336 0.2719 0.4498 0.374 0.6935 1    
WP 0.4637 0.2387 0.4395 0.3724 0.7131 0.7082 1   
PROP 0.547 0.142 0.2782 0.0192 0.6907 0.6465 0.5394 1  
REG 0.5114 0.1133 0.2802 0.112 0.686 0.6166 0.6133 0.7947 1 
INFMKT 0.4629 0.1221 0.3875 0.2779 0.5447 0.5804 0.5393 0.6075 0.53 
Note: Trade: trade policy; Fiscal: fiscal policy; Gov_int: government intervention; Mon_pol: monetary 
policy; For_inv: capital flows and foreign investment; Banking: banking and finance; WP: wages and 
prices; PROP: property rights; REG: regulation; and INF_MKT: informal market 
 
To avoid the above problem of arbitrarily weighted composite index we apply 
the Principal Component Analysis to the ten IEF factors and select some principal 
components as measures of economic freedom. This technique can help reduce the 
dimensionality of the original data while retaining the maximum variation of the 
underlying variables. The principal components, by construction, are independent of 
each other. The parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average partial correlation 
analysis for selecting number of components to be retained indicate that we should use 
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two components. As a result, economic institutions will be represented by the first two 
principal components (COMP1 and COMP2).  
 
Table 2.2 
Principal component loading matrix for Economic Freedom factors 
 Component 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Trade policy 0.3173 -0.0304 0.1902 0.5506 0.182 0.6822 -0.2146 0.0856 -0.0844 -0.0016 
Fiscal burden 0.1453 0.4527 0.8229 -0.1347 0.1491 -0.2153 0.0245 0.0651 -0.0561 -0.0464 
Government 
consumption 0.2545 0.3719 -0.2087 0.6592 -0.2696 -0.417 0.2683 -0.0026 0.0164 -0.0014 
Monetary policy 0.16 0.6411 -0.3547 -0.3297 0.1732 0.3709 0.2282 0.0794 0.2891 0.1393 
Foreign 
investment 0.3753 -0.175 0.1129 -0.0826 -0.3349 -0.0709 -0.3159 0.0664 0.7656 -0.0374 
Banking and 
finance 0.3823 0.0629 -0.0534 -0.1741 -0.1205 0.0638 -0.0823 -0.8241 -0.2062 -0.2641 
Wage and policy 0.3663 0.0792 -0.1186 -0.2658 -0.4359 -0.016 -0.3226 0.3825 -0.5186 0.2551 
Property rights 0.3599 -0.3411 0.1002 -0.0406 0.2089 -0.0877 0.3841 -0.1672 0.0179 0.7178 
Regulation 0.3574 -0.2935 0.0206 -0.161 -0.0323 0.0851 0.5843 0.3246 -0.0826 -0.5458 
Informal market   0.3308 -0.0396 -0.278 -0.0093 0.6932 -0.3905 -0.36 0.1376 -0.0329 -0.1703 
Cumulative 
variance 0.5049 0.6434 0.7264 0.7954 0.8476 0.8931 0.9321 0.9616 0.9838 1 
 
Table 2.2 is the loading matrix of the principal component analysis and the 
cumulative variance that is explained by variances of components. It tells us about the 
importance of principal individual components how they are related to the underlying 
variables. The first component, which by construction has the highest variance, can be 
interpreted as a general measure of freedom. The variance of the first component 
explains 50.5% of the total variance of the 10 factors. The second component is 
positively correlated with fiscal policy, government intervention and monetary policy 
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and negatively correlated with foreign investment, property rights and regulation. We 
can think of the second component as a contrast between macroeconomic policy and 
business-related policy. Higher scores on this component are associated with less 
freedom in terms of macroeconomic environment and more freedom in the business 
environment. Between the first two components they explain 64.3% of the total 
variance of all factors. 
Table 2.3 
Summary statistics for 28 countries, 1995-2005 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
y 23.29 1.65 20.52 28.26 
k 23.76 1.76 20.49 29.03 
l 15.32 1.51 13.4 20.47 
FHI 3.805195 1.98 1 7 
PR 3.75 2.26 1 7 
CL 3.86039 1.75 1 7 
COMP1 -4.74E-09 2.24695 -5.69 4.74 
COMP2 5.13E-10 1.176851 -2.69 2.42 
y, k and l are logarithms of output, capital and labour; FHI is the simple average index of Political 
Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL); COMP1 and COMP2 are the first two principal components of ten 
economic freedom factors. 
 
As for political institutions two measures are widely used in the literature: civil 
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR). These measures are published by the Freedom 
House which uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and 
freedoms enjoyed by individuals. PR and CL are scored from one to seven for each 
country in each year with larger number indicating less freedom. PR and CL are highly 
correlated (0.94) in this sample. In the actual estimations, a simple average index of 
them (FHI) is also used (estimations with PR and CL used separately are reported in the 
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Appendix – Table A2.1). Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of variables used to 
estimate efficiency and effects of determinants of efficiency. 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1.  Baseline estimation 
Both Translog and Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated with the 
final efficiency model being: 
0 1 2 3 4 51 2it it it it i itu COMP COMP FHI RD timeδ δ δ δ δ δ ε= + + + + + +  (1.11) 
 Regressions are run with one regional dummy separately and with CEE as 
control group but only the EA dummy is significant. PR, CL and the simple average of 
them (FHI) are used separately in the regressions but there are no qualitative changes. 
Changes in terms of coefficients’ magnitude are not substantial. Since uit represents 
inefficiency and higher values of institutional variables mean less freedom we expect to 
have positive coefficients β1, β2 and β3. Table 2.4 presents the result with FHI as 
measure of political freedom, with and without and EA - dummy for East Asia (see 
Table A2.1 in the Appendix for results with PR and CL). 
 In all specifications the likelihood ratio test results show that the coefficients of 
the efficiency equation and σ2 and γ are jointly significant. This means the specification 
of the model is correct. The significance of the variance parameters σ2 (sum of 
variances) and γ (variance of inefficiency term over sum of variances) indicates that 
technical efficiency does matter in the production function and that the stochastic 
specification is appropriate. With γ being very close to one in all specifications we can 
say that variation in technical efficiency is substantial among transition economies. 
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Estimation results with FHI 






Translog with EA 
dummy (3)  
Cobb-Douglas 
with EA dummy 
(4) 
Production frontier     
Constant 9.23** (2.68) 10.00*** (19.99) 10.25** (3.58) 10.58*** (21.69) 
k -0.46* (-1.86) 0.1*** (13.87) -0.65** (-3.01) 0.09*** (12.18) 
l 1.18** (4.51) 0.76*** (24.24) 1.35*** (8.4) 0.73*** (22.86) 
k2 0.03*** (30.13) - 0.03*** (34.28) - 
l2 -0.02 (-1.22) - -0.03** (-2.7) - 
kl -0.01 (-0.82) - -0.001 (-0.9) - 
time -0.02** (-4.0) 0.03** (2.92) -0.02*** (-5.12) 0.03** (2.91) 
Efficiency effects     
Constant -34.86*** (-0.6) -44.14*** (-15.01) -33.68*** (-26.59) - 51.27*** (-0.67) 
COMP1 1.23*** (9.61) 0.81** (4.89) 0.82** (3.86) 0.59** (2.43) 
COMP2 2.46*** (7.4) 13.8** (3.2) 1.48** (3.45) 0.96** (2.33) 
FHI 2.85*** (12.27) 5.3*** (12.19) 3.68*** (13.02) 6.7*** (17.74) 
East Asia    - 15.82*** (-2.77) -7.8*** (-6.57) 
Time trend 1.1*** (11.81) 0.89*** (7.9) 0.79*** (5.46) 0.86*** (7.1) 
σ2 13.64*** (24.1) 19.41*** (10) 11.57*** (11.64) 25.12*** (10.66) 
γ 0.99*** (3423.1) 0.99*** (402.11) 0.99*** (3425.9) 0.99*** (715.15) 
Log likelihood  -195.73 -419.4  -181.75 -414.3  
Likelihood ratio test 845.86 425.4 873.82 435.6 
 t-ratio in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Higher COMP1, 
COMP1 and FHI mean less freedom. 
 
In efficiency analysis, it is important to have good specification of the 
production function since different technologies will result in different measures of 
efficiency. As mentioned in Section II the Cobb-Douglas technology has been rejected 
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in several tests. Here, following the same line, specification tests are also done by 
calculating generalized likelihood ratios and they show that translog models should be 
used in frontier and efficiency analyses for transition economies (the ratios are 447.4 
and 465.2 for specification with and without EA dummy respectively).  
 The first important finding of this chapter is the significance of economic and 
political freedoms in determining efficiency. In all the models presented in the Table 
2.4, economic and political freedoms have positive and significant coefficients. Since uit 
in equation (2.8) is inefficiency (or distance from the frontier) and higher values of 
economic and political freedoms means less freedom, the positive coefficients can be 
interpreted as implying that higher level of freedom is associated with higher level of 
efficiency.  
 Empirically, the effect of democracy on growth and efficiency has been 
controversial in the literature. Minier (1998) finds that countries that democratized early 
growth faster than others who did not choose a democratic path. Barro (1996) reports a 
hump-shaped relationship between democracy and growth. When trying to disentangle 
the effect of democracy on growth Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) concludes that, overall, 
the negative effect of democracy is larger than the positive one. In Adkins et al. (2002) 
the Political Rights and Civil Liberties are not significant. Here they do turn out to be 
significant both through the composite index and on their own (Table A2.1 in the 
Appendix), even after the economic freedom has been controlled for. This is consistent 
with the result found in Meon and Weill (2005) for a larger set of countries that the rule 
of law and control of corruption are associated with higher efficiency. 
The second significant finding is that the coefficient of East Asia dummy is 
negative and significant. This means that East Asia’s transition economies on average, 
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ceteris paribus, are more efficient than the Eastern European and Former Soviet Union 
countries in the sample. This empirical result may look counter-intuitive for some 
people since many Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
for example) have rather advanced production base vis-à-vis the East Asian ones. 
However, this result can manifest the fact that the Eastern European transition 
economies underwent an initial period of “disorganization” when the old production 
system was destroyed almost overnight and a new one has not been in place (Blanchard 
and Kremer, 1997). It takes time to build new business links, to employ new technology 
and to adjust production methods to market signals, especially when market was 
fledgling. At the same time China, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia had been 
experimenting with market economy for a while before the beginning of the period 
under study. The interesting point is that East Asian transition countries manage to use 
more efficiently the resources they have though they have less production capacity than 
Central and Eastern European ones in this period. 
Among the East Asian economies China was the first to reform and adopt 
market economy, though gradually. More importantly, China is a huge country and it 
has produced a remarkable growth rate since the beginning of its reform. Therefore 
there are reasons to believe that the East Asian effect is dominated by China and 
possibly only by China. To check if Cambodia and Vietnam also have the efficiency 
effect the model (3) in Table 2.4 is estimated again with a dummy for China and another 
one for Cambodia and Vietnam in the efficiency equation. The result is that are both 
significant (Table A2.2 in the Appendix). Thus, there seems to be evidence to suppor 
the argument that the East Asian transition economies have higher efficiency than the 
other countries in the sample given the same level of production factors and institutions. 
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All this said, it is worth mentioning that East Asian countries have less economic and 
political freedom on average (3.68 compared to 3.06 of CEE and 3.5 of FSU on 
aggregate EFI score; 6.39 compared with 2.15 and 4.38 on FHI). 
4.2.  Robustness check: endogeneity of capital and use of factor analysis 
The capital series that is generated from equation (2.10) may be correlated with 
output because it calculated with average output growth rate. This correlation would 
make the estimation of production frontier and efficiency scores inaccurate. Therefore, 
we re-estimate the model with lagged k. In addition, instead of using regional dummies 
and time variable we use country dummies and year dummies to see if institutional 
measures have any effect on efficiency scores after country-specific and year-specific 
characteristics have been controlled for. 
In the previous section we use principal component analysis to reduce the data 
dimension of the economic freedom indexes but principal component analysis is less 
accurate than principal factor analysis in exploring latent structures. In addition, 
imposing orthogonality between components is not a practical strategy since 
socioeconomic variables are usually correlated. Therefore, we apply principal factor 
analysis to economic freedom indexes in order to in an effort to better conceptualize the 
relationship between constructed indexes of economic freedom and transition progress 
and investment rate. The difference between principal component analysis and factor 
analysis is that principal component method uses all variability in an item while factors 
analysis uses only the variability in an item that it has in common with the other items 
for identifying latent structures. Therefore, factor analysis is seen as a better tool to 
detect the underlying structure of the data and more accurate (Widaman, 1993). 
Following factor analysis researchers often apply rotation techniques to find factors 
Chapter II  Institutions and Efficiency in  




whose relationships with the underlying variables are clearer or easier to identify. In 
other words, we make use of oblique rotation to have a clearer pattern of loadings. As 
for the number of factors to be retained both scree test and parallel analysis suggest two 
factors. 
Table 2.5 shows the loadings of economic freedom indexes on the first two 
components or factors, with and without rotation. Without rotation, factors and 
components have high loadings from several indexes, which makes it difficult to 
interpret the factors or components. When oblique rotation is applied we have a clearer 
pattern of loadings. We can say that rotated factor 1 is defined by foreign investment 
freedom and wage and price freedom while rotated factor 2 is defined by property 
rights.  
Table 2.5 
Loadings of principal components and principal factors (rotated) 
  Principal component analysis Factor analysis, no 
rotation 
Factor analysis, 
rotation by oblique 
method 
  Component 1 Component 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Trade policy 0.317 -0.030 0.659 -0.002 0.166 0.263 
Fiscal burden 0.145 0.453 0.280 0.287 0.028 0.002 
Government 
consumption 
0.255 0.372 0.513 0.336 0.190 -0.045 
Monetary 
policy 
0.160 0.641 0.323 0.577 -0.020 -0.024 
Foreign 
investment 
0.375 -0.175 0.827 -0.151 0.798 0.085 
Banking and 
finance 
0.382 0.063 0.836 0.125 0.359 0.337 
Wage and 
policy 
0.366 0.079 0.798 0.150 0.761 -0.008 
Property 
rights 
0.360 -0.341 0.803 -0.381 -0.050 0.918 
Regulation 0.357 -0.294 0.790 -0.303 0.137 0.769 
Informal 
market   
0.331 -0.040 0.696 0.012 0.088 0.456 
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Estimations with lagged k, East Asia dummy and time trend  


















Production frontier       
Constant 8.46*** 8.05*** 8.75*** 7.16*** 7.79*** 8.37*** 
k -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.49*** 
l 1.34*** 1.36*** 1.31*** 1.5*** 1.39*** 1.37*** 
k2 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
l2 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
kl -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
Time trend -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
Efficiency effects       
Constant -41.44*** -29.93*** -40.88*** -22.31*** -35.88*** -35.06*** 
COMP 1/Factor 1 0.3*** 3.32*** -0.25 7.9***   
COMP 2/Factor 2 0.55 2.51*** 4***  12.15***  
FHI 5.44***  4.51***   5.16*** 
East Asia -19.53*** -8.39*** -17.66*** -15.75*** 0.32 -13.84*** 
Time trend 0.48*** 1.52*** 0.84*** 0.22** 2.45*** 0.27** 
Sigma-squared 16.31*** 21.74*** 17.05*** 21.45*** 20.14*** 11.06*** 
Gamma 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
Log likelihood -238.62 -276.98 -236.05 -285.67 -264.64 -252.63 
Likelihood ratio test 902.97 826.26 908.12 808.87 850.94 874.95 
 *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Higher value of COMP1, COMP2, Factor 
1, Factor 2 and FHI mean less freedom. 
 
 Table 2.6 presents the estimation results when lagged k is used in production 
function, East Asia dummy, time trend and either principal components or principal 
factors. Here, we focus only estimate translog production function since we have 
evidence that translog function is favoured over Cobb-Douglas function. Likelihood 
ratio tests for all specifications suggest that stochastic model is correct and that 
efficiency is indeed significant. The general impression is that the effect of institutional 
variables on efficiency is still significant. However, there are differences now as lagged 
k is used. Result in column (1) of Table 2.6 shows that the second principal component 
becomes insignificant though having expected sign. The specification in column (2) 
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caters for the fact that there is considerable correlation between the two components and 
FHI. Without FHI in the efficiency equation both components are significant and of 
large magnitude. Concerning the principal factors, the first factor has unexpected sign 
and is not significant when they are used together with FHI. However, when they are 
used one by one all of their coefficients are significant and have expected sign. As for 
East Asia dummy it is significant in all specification except in column (5) when the 
second factor which indicates quality of property rights is used. That means property 
rights institution is an important determinant of efficiency and when we only control for 
property rights East Asia no longer has advantage in efficiency over other regions. 
Table 2.7 presents the results when country and year dummies are used to 
control for country-specific and year-specific variables that could have impact on 
production efficiency of transition economies. In general the results are similar to those 
obtained by using contemporaneous k with East Asia dummy and time trend (Table 2.4) 
or lagged k with East Asia dummy and time trend (Table 2.6). In column (3) the 
coefficient of the first factor is negative, which suggests that better institution in terms 
of foreign investment and wage and price policy would lead to lower efficiency. 
However, this result is flawed by correlation between the two factors (due to oblique 
rotation) and FHI. Therefore, conclusions should be drawn from results in column (2) 
and columns (4)-(6). Again, factor two or property rights institution is more important 
than factor 1. Another thing to be noted is that when country and year dummies are used 
the coefficients of institutional indicators are smaller as compared to when East Asia 
dummy and time trend is used. Looking from any angle, however, we can confirm that 
institutional quality has a significant and positive effect on efficiency of transition 
economies. 
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Estimations with lagged k, country dummies and year dummies 



















Production frontier     
Constant 9.58*** 9.44*** 9.71*** 9.66*** 9.56*** 9.66*** 
k -0.5*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.5*** -0.49*** -0.46*** 
l 1.22*** 1.21*** 1.2*** 1.2*** 1.2*** 1.13*** 
k2 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
l2 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
kl -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
Time trend -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
Efficiency effects       
Constant -14.12*** -9.72*** -13.47*** -9.34*** -11.36*** -18.71*** 
COMP 1/Factor 1 0.53*** 0.72*** -1.84*** 1.02***   
COMP 2/Factor 2 2.33*** 2.15*** 5.18***  3***  
FHI 0.89***  0.84***   0.68*** 
Sigma-squared 8.83*** 7.95*** 8.49*** 9.36*** 8.33*** 9.65*** 
Gamma 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
Log likelihood -139.86 -138.19 -136.16 -144.04 -136.60 -149.26 
Likelihood ratio test 1100.50 1103.84 1107.89 1092.13 1107.01 1081.71 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Higher value of COMP1, COMP2, Factor 
1, Factor 2 and FHI mean less freedom. Country dummies are jointly significant and the same is true for 
year dummies but their coefficients are not reported. 
 
5.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The role of institutions in economic growth and efficiency has been discussed 
widely in the literature. Though empirical results change from one measure of 
institution to another, or from one dataset to another there seems to be a general 
conclusion that institutions do have positive effects on growth and efficiency. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc the experience of transition economies has provided 
something akin to a natural experiment to test the effect of institutions on efficiency. 
Applying stochastic frontier analysis technique, this chapter has confirmed the positive 
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effects of economic and political institutions as measured by the Index of Economic 
Freedom (Heritage Foundation) and the Freedom House Index respectively. For 28 
transition economies over the period 1995-2005, more economic or political freedom is 
found to reduce the level of inefficiency. In other words, better institutions are 
associated with higher level of efficiency. Particularly, the use of principal factors has 
shown that property rights protection is very important for improving production 
efficiency. So far the empirical result about the effect of political freedom on economic 
performance has been mixed but this empirical study shows that it does have significant 
role in improving efficiency, at least in the context of transition economies. Of course 
institutions do not solely determine efficiency but improvement of institutional quality 
should help transition economies to gain higher efficiency. The positive role of 
institutions found here is robust to different constructed measures of capital series 
(depreciation rates of 10% and 6%). 
 Though the issue of causality between institution and efficiency is controversial 
and the results obtained here can be subject to questions about the quality of 
institutional measurement, we think this research will contribute to clearer 
understanding of the role of institutions in economic performance, both economic and 
political. 
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 CHAPTER III - INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF 
INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Investment is the key to maintaining and expanding the capital stock and 
production capacity of an economy. In the neoclassical growth framework higher capital 
accumulation means higher output and higher growth in transition to the steady state of 
an economy. In endogenous growth theory investment affects growth directly through 
accumulation of input and indirectly through improved factor productivity. New 
investment in physical and human capital introduces new technologies into the 
production base of an economy, thus improving its efficiency and productivity and 
altering its long run growth rate. The role of investment has been empirically confirmed 
in many studies such as: Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), De Long 
and Summers (1991), Fischer (1993), Khan and Kumar (1997), Bouton and Sumlinski 
(2000) and others. In fact, investment is one of the few determinants of growth that 
remain significant in a sensitivity analysis by Levine and Renelt (1992). 
Since the fall of the Soviet Bloc the former socialist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Central and Eastern Asia have embarked on largely different growth 
paths. All of them except East Asian ones saw their output plunge in the early 1990s. 
Following initial production collapse in Eastern and Central Europe and former Soviet 
Union some countries quickly settled down and regained positive growth as early as 
1992 or 1993 (Poland and Czech Republic) while others dragged on with their output 
contraction until 1995-1996 (Russia, Ukraine, and some other former Soviet Union 
countries). One the basis of growth performance, there seems to be some geographical 
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pattern. Countries of the former Soviet Union had to endure longest output drop. Those 
in Central Europe and Baltic area had a shorter period of recession. Those in East Asia 
did not suffer from any output loss at all.  
Many researchers have formulated theoretical explanations and empirical tests 
for various factors that may have caused the marked variation in the growth 
performance of transition economies. Among the often cited determinants of the growth 
variation are initial conditions, liberalization and transition policies, and institutional 
factors15. The question about what drives investment has been long studied16
                                                 
15 See, for example, De Mello et al. (1996 & 2001), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Fidrmuc (2003), 
Harvrylyshyn and Roden (2003), Falcetti et al. (2006) for details. 
. However, 
works in this field study broad cross sections or panels of countries that do not cover 
transition economies. To our best knowledge, the literature on investment in transition 
countries is focused on firms’ investment constraints and behaviour. Budina et al. 
(2000) study the relation between liquidity constraints and firms’ investment in Bulgaria 
and find that liquidity constraints only bind for small firms; large firms still have access 
to easy bank finance. Similarly, Konings et al. (2003) find soft budget constraints for 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania but Polish and Czech’s firms face hardened liquidity 
constraints which are an impediment for investment. Mueller and Peev (2007) study 
investment returns of publicly traded firms in Central and Eastern Europe and find 
evidence of under investment due to asymmetric information and over investment due 
to managerial discretion. In general, these studies use firm level data and relate firms’ 
investment behaviour to financial constraints. None has tried to explain difference in 
investment rates for the whole group of transition countries. The purpose of this chapter 
is to fill this gap in literature on transition economies. Since institutions are theoretically 
16 Some examples are: Levine and Renelt (1992), Ozler and Rodik (1992), Dawson (1998), Ghura and 
Goodwin (2000), Attanasio et al. (2000) and Campos and Nugent (2003). 
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proposed and empirically found to be a very important determinant of growth and 
development, we are particularly interested in examining the role of institutions and 
reform policies in explaining investment difference among transition economies. 
Analyzing a dataset on transition economies over the period 1990-2007 we find 
that institutional factors, both economic and political, have significant effect on the 
investment rate. In addition, more transition progress is also found to be associated with 
higher investment. Besides, domestic saving and financial deepening are strong 
determinants of investment as well. 
Section 2 of this chapter will explore possible determinants of investment in 
transition economies. Section 3 will discuss institutional development and investment in 
transition economies since the early years of the transition process. After that Section 4 
will present the data and empirical approach for estimating the effects of institutional 
factors on investment. Section 5 will discuss the results and the chapter is concluded in 
Section 6. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW - DETERMINANTS OF INVESTMENT RATE 
In this section we explore some essential factors that are theoretically expected 
and empirically proven to affect investment rate in contexts other than transition 
economies. They are categorized as institutions, transitional reform policies, 
macroeconomic factors, and financial development. 
2.1.  Institutional factors 
As discussed in Chapter 1, institutions facilitate economic exchanges and 
determine resource allocation and efficiency of economic activities. An important 
indicator of the quality of institution is the level of freedom, both economic and 
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political, that economic actors can enjoy in pursuit of their economic goals. When 
people are free from fear of expropriation and troubles inherent in market (information, 
agency, coordination, etc.) they have more incentive to invest in economic activities and 
do so with higher efficiency. 
With regard to investment the most important institution is the protection of 
property rights. Without secure property rights the incentives to invest will be reduced, 
especially in research and development activities that require large investment but, 
potentially, are very profitable. When properties are not properly protected resources 
will be diverted away from production, often to rent-seeking activities which further 
deter investment while encouraging further rent-seeking. Murphy et al. (1993) argue 
that rent-seeking activities exhibit natural increasing returns, which may lead to 
multiple equilibria with high levels of rent-seeking and low output. Acemoglu (1995) 
shows that rent-seeking reduces marginal productivity of investment and that increased 
rent-seeking makes rent-seeking relatively more attractive compared to investment in 
production. It has been argued by many authors, like North (1990) and Knack and 
Keefer (1995), that the private property rights are the backbone of the prosperous 
Western capitalism.  
Transaction cost is a big hurdle for economic exchange and evolution of 
institutions through economic history has been the finding of solutions to the problem of 
high transaction cost. New institutions help reduce transaction cost, encourage more 
production and exchanges, thus allowing economic actors to realize gains from 
specialization and trade. As a result productive activities become more attractive and 
more investment is made. With the same level of investment, lower transaction cost 
means more output.  
Chapter III Institutional Determinants of Investment 
 in Transition Economies 
48 
 
Corruption is an example of bad institutions and it is very harmful to investment. 
Corruption is a kind of tax, hence raising costs and uncertainty for business activities. 
Worse than tax, corruption is not transparent, not predictable and not reliable. 
Corruption tends to reduce government revenues (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998) because 
corruption is the most manifest in tax collection and the corrupt money, instead of being 
spent by the government on investment or consumption, goes into private pockets. 
Therefore the level of investment will be lower when corruption is rampant, which is 
proved empirically by Mauro (1995). More seriously, corruption makes investment less 
efficient. In public sector corruption may shift public investment away from the most 
profitable projects to less profitable ones that offer more opportunities for corruption 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Pritchett (2000) cites an example of a steel mill in Nigeria 
where spending overshot by US$ 4 billion and US$ 2 billion are reported to be stolen by 
government officials. In the private sector, corruption favours those with connections 
with government officials over those who have high productive efficiency (Elliott, 
1997). In addition, bad governance reduces the incentive to invest in R&D (Meon and 
Weil, 2005), thus limiting opportunities to improve efficiency.  
However, there have been arguments that corruption helps “grease the wheel” 
(Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; and Leys, 1965 as cited in Meon and Sekkat, 2005). The 
hypothesis suggests that corruption and bribery may be the second best solution due to 
distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions. When bad institutions are in place and 
there are no ways to change them, corruption may serve as a device to overcome hurdles 
to economic transactions, investment and promoting growth. This hypothesis has been 
tested by Meon and Sekkat (2005) and they find evidence against it. Their study shows 
that a weak rule of law, an inefficient government and political violence make the 
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negative effect of corruption on investment worse. So, it seems that all empirical 
evidences point to the negative effect of corruption on investment.  
Apart from institutions that constrain directly economic activities, political and 
civil institutions are also very important for capital accumulation. Rodrik (2000) 
considers democracy as a meta-institution for building good institutions and argues that 
participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and 
aggregating local knowledge which is essential for building institutions. Sandholtz and 
Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when democratic norms and institutions are 
stronger. In an effort to explain causes of corruption Treisman (2000) also concludes 
that democracy reduces corruption though it is well-established democracy rather than 
recent democratization process that matters (Sung (2004) also comes to similar 
conclusion).  As Dawson (1998) empirically shows, political and civil liberties stimulate 
investment in a cross section of 85 countries.  
2.2.  Transitional factors 
Transition process involves liberalization of markets and prices, privatization of 
state-owned firms, restructuring firms towards market incentives and building economic 
and social institutions and infrastructures to promote growth. When markets and prices 
are liberalised, investors have more incentives to invest and do business because they 
have the freedom to set prices and sell and buy goods to where/who they want. 
Privatization of state assets is perhaps the most important drive for investment because 
more assets are in private sector’s hand with their rights recognized by the state. 
Privatization is a signal of commitment to private ownership and offers profitable 
investment opportunities, especially in public utilities sector (Holland and Pain, 1998). 
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Besides, governments would have larger budget from privatization proceeds to spend on 
public investment.  
Structural reforms in transition countries have been implemented extensively, 
especially privatization of small scale enterprises (IMF, 2000). However, the reform 
progress has been uneven across countries. In 2005 the Transition Index, which is 
constructed by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) to 
reflect the transition progress, ranges from 1.89 (Turkmenistan) to the highest level of 
4.3 (Hungary, Czech Republic and some others).  
Reform as measured by the EBRD Transition Index is expected to boost 
investment in transition countries because they create room for private sector’s 
participation in economic activities through privatization and incentives for 
entrepreneurs to invest. Moreover, privatization generates government revenue for 
government investment development programmes.  
2.3.  Macroeconomic and financial factors  
Macroeconomic policies, together with institutions, shape the incentive 
structures that investors face when making investment decision. Domestic saving and 
growth provide the necessary resources for both government and entrepreneurs to 
invest. Trade policy, macroeconomic stability (inflation) and public finance are 
important factors to be considered. Financial system is the blood vessel of an economy 
that channel funds from saving to investment and the level of financial  development is 
expected to have a strong role in determining investment of an economy.  
The relationship between saving and investment has been a focal topic in 
economic literature since the study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), which identified 
what later came to be called the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Contrary to the prediction of 
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the perfect capital mobility theory, Feldstein and Horioka observe that, for OECD 
countries, domestic saving rates and domestic investment rates are highly correlated. 
Nowadays, global financial integration has gone very far but most transition economies 
still face many obstacles in accessing the international capital market and domestic 
savings is still critical for investment and growth. Analyzing a panel of 150 countries 
over 1960-1994 period, Attanasio et al. (2000) find that lagged saving rates are 
positively correlated with investment rates. As a result, we expect that lagged savings 
rate in transition economies should have a positive effect on the investment rate. 
The significant role of investment in growth has been found in many cross 
section studies as mentioned in the Introduction. Some other growth models suggest that 
a rise in productivity growth causes both growth rates and investment rates to move 
together (Barro, 1991 and Islam, 1995). For the effect of growth on investment the 
accelerator theory argues that high growth rates lead to high demand for capital stock 
and real investment and vice versa though the adjustment may take time. The effect 
could also run indirectly through saving rate as Loayza et al. (2000) shows that private 
saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real income. Empirically, when the 
dynamics of the growth-investment relation is studied it has been shown that “growth 
rates Granger-cause investment rates with a positive sign” (Attanasio et al., 2000). 
Therefore, we expect lagged growth rate to have positive effect on investment. 
Gains from trade have long been studied and emphasized in the economic 
literature. A more export-oriented economy would have more access to world market, 
which makes it possible for producers to invest and obtain gains from economy of scale. 
More export would bring about more foreign exchange earnings necessary to finance 
import of capital goods, which is very important for economies in the process of 
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restructuring their production base. However, trade liberalization may lead to domestic 
market being swamped by imported goods and domestic producers find it hard to 
compete, thus limiting domestic producers’ investment and expansion activities. 
Therefore, there is an argument for protection of some infant industries with high level 
of externalities, learning by doing and economy of scale against foreign competition 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). Of course whether the infant industries grow to be 
competitive internationally requires much more than protection by trade measures.   
According to Fisher (1993) inflation is the most important single indicator of the 
macroeconomic environment as far as investment and growth is concerned. Inflation 
signals uncertainty and makes it difficult for investors to evaluate their investment 
projects, thus forcing them to postpone investment. During high inflation episodes 
economic actors tend to switch from long term to short term transactions, which 
increase transaction cost. In some empirical studies inflation has been found to have 
significantly negative effect on private investment (e.g. Greene and Villanueva, 1991; 
Ozler and Rodrik, 1992 and Madsen, 2003). However, high inflation often means low 
real interest rate, which makes borrowings cheaper for investors. Romer (2001) argues 
that inflation is also a potential source of government revenue through seignorage and 
under some conditions it is optimal for government to use this revenue resource in 
addition to usual taxes. Empirically, Bleaney (1996) finds no negative effect of inflation 
on total investment. Therefore, we can expect some mixed or insignificant effect of 
inflation on investment.  
Analyzing an endogenous growth model with government spending, Barro 
(1990) argues an increase in non-productive government expenditures, for a given level 
of productive government expenditures, would raise income tax rate. As a result, private 
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sector investment would decrease because individuals have less incentive to invest. In 
reality, it is possible that an increase in non-productive government spending leads to a 
decrease in investment in both public and private sectors. Especially, if government 
consumption is financed by borrowing it gives rise to public debt and consequently 
investors’ doubt about the stability of the macroeconomic environment and future tax 
burden. Empirically, Barro (1991) shows that higher government consumption is 
associated with lower growth in a panel of 98 countries in the 1960-1985 period. 
Therefore, higher level of government consumption relative to GDP is expected to have 
negative impact on investment. 
Availability of finance is one of the most important factors for entrepreneurs to 
carry out business activity. Financial system pools savings together and channels funds 
from savers to investors. Without a financial system savers often hoard their savings in 
non-productive assets such as gold and jewellery. According to Levine (1997) 
individual savers may not have the time, capability and means to collect and process 
information on firms and investment opportunities, therefore they are not willing to 
invest. Financial institutions help solve this information problem. Financial institutions 
select, supposedly, the best investors who can make the most from available funds. 
Financial system in developing or transition economies play an even more important 
role because firms in these economies depend more on external financing than those in 
developed economies (Oshikoya, 1994). In addition, financial intermediation creates 
money and provides means of transaction, reducing transaction cost and promoting 
economic exchange and expansion of production (Levine, 1997). Without a well-
functioning financial system it is very difficult for firms to engage in selling their 
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products to foreign markets and importing capital goods for investment and expansion. 
In general, we can expect a positive effect of financial deepening on investment. 
Last but not least, interest rate is the cost of capital that is taken into account 
when investment decisions are made. High interest rates mean high discount rates which 
render projects not viable financially, especially for small or newly-established 
businesses that are more reliant on borrowings. Bernanke (1983) reports that high 
interest rates are a major source of sluggishness in capital expenditure in 1947-1979 
period in the United States. For developing countries, Greene and Villanueva (1991) 
shows that real interest rate is one of several macroeconomic determinants of private 
investment in the 1975-1987 period. Therefore, we also include real interest rate as an 
explanatory variable. One thing we should keep in mind is that our dependent variable 
is total investment rate which includes both private and public investment as percentage 
of GDP. In episodes of high interest rates private investment may be depressed but 
public investment may not be affected since major investment projects are planned and 
implemented over a long period of time. In times of tightened monetary policy the 
government may utilize fiscal expansion to maintain the demand level through 
investment in infrastructure projects. Therefore, in the context of this study it is an open 
question whether real interest rate would have a significant effect on the national 
investment rates. One more thing to keep in mind is that real interest rate might be 
correlated with inflation rate and regressions that include both of them might be biased 
due to multicollinearity.  
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3.  INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES  
3.1.  Institution building in transition economies 
Transition economies are in a process of building new market-based institutions 
to promote economic growth. Most of them started with an “institutional collapse” 
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002) which is often cited as one of the reasons for the initial 
output drop in these economies. However, institutional quality in transition economies 
has improved quickly and substantially. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the evolution 
of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom17 (IEF) and the Freedom 
House Index (FHI)18. The Heritage Foundation’s Index is a composite index of ten 
different factors of economic freedom rated on the scale of 0-100, with higher value 
representing more freedom. The FHI is a measure of political freedom which is a simple 
average of civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) with score going from 0 to 7 
with 7 being no freedom. In Figure 1, for the ease of comparison, the Freedom House 
Index is rescaled to the 0-100 range and higher value means more freedom19
                                                 
17 See Holmes et al., 2008 for details. 
. The lines 
in Figure 1 represent the averages of either IEF or FHI for three groups of transition 
economies: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), former Soviet Union (FSU) and East 
Asia (EA). All three groups have made significant moves towards freedom, both 
economic and political, but the CEE countries are the fastest. They started with better 
institutional quality and are now in a much better position than the FSU or EA 
countries. The EA countries started at the lowest level of freedom and are still far 
behind the others. 
18 Data available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439  
19 See more details about these indexes in Section 4 
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Another widely used measure of economic freedom is the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI)20
 There is a wide gap in institutional quality between transition economies. Some 
countries have achieved institutional quality that is at the same level or even higher than 
developed countries. In 2008 Latvia, Czech Republic and Hungary had higher IEF score 
than France or Portugal. At the same time Russia, Belarus and Turkmenistan were 
ranked 136, 147 and 152 respectively out of 157 countries in 2008. In terms of political 
freedom, the Freedom in the World Report 2008 categorizes all CEE countries as free 
while most of FSU and EA countries as not free. The experience of transition 
economies in terms of building a completely new institutional system (in Central and 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries) or reforming an old system (in East 
Asia) for the functioning of a market economy can be viewed as something close to a 
natural experiment for analyzing the effect of institutions on investment. 
. This index is available from 1970 but before 2000 it 
is only available for every five years. Besides, we have EFI for only 21 transition 
countries. The EFI scores ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being most free. Figure 2 in the 
Appendix shows the changes of EFI for three groups of transition economies over 2000-
2006 and we can see the same trend as shown in Figure 1.  
3.2.  Investment in transition economies 
Initially, investment fell sharply in the CEE and FSU countries. When the 
government revenue was low and business environment was just taking form this was 
quite a foreseeable situation. In East Asian countries, though the investment did not fall 
but it hardly saw any growth in the early 1990s. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows that the 
investment was cut the most in the FSU countries and these are the last who recovered 
                                                 
20 See Gwartney et al., 2008 for details 
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from investment downturn. On average, EA has the highest investment growth 
(11.13%), followed by CEE (6.62%) and FSU (3.65%). 
Figure 4 in the Appendix depicts the investment-GDP rates of transition 
economies by groups. Except for 1990 the EA has always maintained a higher 
investment rate than those of CEE and FSU. Since 1997 this rate has gone up from 
around 25% to 33% (in 2007). The investment rates of CEE and FSU have also 
increased from 20% in early 1990s to 25% in 2007.  
Figure 5 (Appendix) is a scatter plot of the investment rate and GDP growth rate 
in 30 transition economies over the 1995-2006 period. It shows us some positive 
association between growth rate and investment rate. Though the investment-growth 
relation is not the subject of this chapter it helps justify the purpose of this. If we know 
factors that drive investment we may know what drives growth, at least partially. To 
better understand causes of growth we need to understand the factors that determine the 
investment rate. 
4.  DATA AND MODEL 
4.1.  Data  
For economic freedom the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 
(IEF) and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI) are the most popular 
measures. However, the Fraser Institute’s EFI covers only 21 transition countries21
                                                 
21 18 Central and Eastern European countries and three East Asian countries. 
 and 
before the year 2000 it was only available for every five years. Therefore, we use the 
Heritage Foundation’s IEF as a proxy of economic freedom. The data start in 1995 and 
are available for all transition countries. The IEF is a simple average of 10 individual 
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freedoms which are considered vital to the development of personal and national 
prosperity. The individual freedoms are: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, 
property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom. The methodology for 
constructing the freedoms has been revised several times to enhance the robustness and 
the entire time series have been recalculated accordingly. For the 2008 version of the 
IEF the authors use a 0-100 percent grading scale so that a higher score represents more 
freedom. The difference between this data set and others is that the values of the 
variables are calculated with data available from various sources like the World Bank 
Development Indicators22
For political institutions, two measures are widely used in the literature: civil 
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) reported in the Freedom House’s Freedom of the 
World (Rodrik, 2000; and Havrylyshyn and Rooden, 2003, for example). The Freedom 
House uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and freedoms 
enjoyed by individuals in almost all countries in the world since 1972. Political rights 
refer to free participation in the political process, right to vote freely for distinct 
alternatives in legitimate elections, right to compete for public office, join political 
parties and organizations. Civil liberties mean the freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. The Freedom of the World does not rate government or 
government performance per se but the real world rights and freedoms. The PR and CL 
, which are more objective than subjective survey data. For 
available data, the correlation coefficient between the Heritage Foundation’s IEF and 
the Fraser Institute’s EFI is 0.83 (126 observations). 
                                                 
22 See Miles et al. (2006) for details. 
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are scored from one to seven for each country in each year with larger number 
indicating less freedom. The PR and CL are highly correlated (0.94) in this sample.  
The EBRD transition scores are the judgement of the EBRD’s Office of the 
Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition. The scores range from 1 
to 4+, with 4+ coded as 4.33 and 4- equal 3.67 and so on. Averages are obtained by 
rounding down. For example, a score of 2.6 is treated as 2+, but a score of 2.8 is treated 
as 3-. The higher the scores the more transition progress a country has made. The 
following aspects of transition are assessed and scored: large scale privatization, small 
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade 
and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalization, securities market and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure 
reform. Due to data availability, we do not use scores of infrastructure reform in this 
chapter. The data on transition indicators is available for download from the EBRD’s 
website. Unfortunately, we do not have the transition indicators for four East Asian 
transition countries (Cambodia, China, Laos and Vietnam).  
Data for dependent variable and control variables other than institutional ones 
are collected from the World Bank Development Indicators (2008). Investment is total 
fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP. Saving is domestic saving as percentage 
of GDP. Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Openness is measured by the sum of 
import and export as percentage of GDP. For inflation we use the change in GDP 
deflator instead of change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) because the CPI inflation 
series has more missing observations. Real interest rate is the difference between 
average lending rate and inflation rate which is based on GDP deflator. For financial 
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development we use a very popular indicator which is the liquid liabilities as percentage 
of GDP (M3/GDP).  
Table 3.1 
 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment 373 23.69 6.72 4.03 53.20 
Growth  383 5.44 5.10 -16.70 34.50 
Saving 374 17.58 13.15 -22.65 57.61 
Real interest rate 334 7.62 15.70 -70.15 77.11 
OPEN 382 99.29 32.48 36.39 181.68 
M3 366 36.77 27.94 6.72 163.31 
Government consumption 375 15.60 5.41 3.47 29.39 
Inflation 383 31.81 104.71 -5.18 1174.29 
Economic Freedom 358 54.53 9.45 30.02 77.96 
Transition Index 338 3.79 0.67 1.78 4.33 
Freedom House Index 390 3.80 2.02 1 7 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; author’s 
calculation. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of variables used in this chapter and 
Table 3.2 shows the pair-wise correlation between them. As discussed in Section II, 
there are quite large variations in both the dependent and independent variables. The 
correlation between three composite measures of institution is high, ranging from 0.58 
to 0.74 in absolute value (Table 3.2). This suggests some consistency in measuring 
institutional quality in transition economies, especially between the economic freedom 
and transition progress index (correlation coefficient of 0.74). In addition, inflation and 
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real interest rate are significantly and negatively correlated (-0.37). This calls for 
caution when both inflation and interest rate are used in the same regression equation. 
 
Table 3.2 
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 










Growth 1         
Saving 0.0638 1        
Interest rate 0.0797 -0.0564 1       
Openness 0.0273 0.0153 -0.0478 1      
M3 0.0201 0.3805 -0.0841 -0.0356 1     
Government 
consumption 
-0.211 0.0798 -0.031 0.1256 0.0996 1    
Inflation -0.3695 -0.1369 -0.3713 0.066 -0.0635 -0.0685 1   
Economic 
Freedom 
0.1072 -0.0121 0.068 0.3012 0.2325 0.1723 -0.2452 1  
Transition Index 0.5501 -0.1715 0.2390 0.1612 0.1706 -0.0163 -0.2613 0.7448 1 
Political Freedom 0.0437 0.077 -0.0321 -0.2753 -0.1181 -0.349 0.0916 -0.662 -0.58 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; author’s 
calculation. 
4.2.  Model and methodology 
In order to test empirically for the role of institutions in determining investment 
rate we estimate a panel data model as follows: 
INVit = α0+α1INSit+ α2GROi,t-1+ α3SAVi,t-1+ α4OPENit+ α5M3it+ α6INF+ α7IRit +   
α8GCONit+ ci +εit         (3.1) 
with i=1, 2, …N and t=1, 2, …, T  
The dependent variable INVit is investment as percentage of GDP and ci is an 
unobserved effect that is country specific and time constant. The εit are the idiosyncratic 
errors that change across time t and country i. INSit is institutional variable which can be 
composite indexes like IEF, FHI and EBRD or any individual factors of them. GROi,t-1 
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is the lagged real GDP growth rate23
This is a panel data model with a country specific unobserved effect that can be 
estimated by either fixed effect (FE) estimation or random effect (RE) estimation 
techniques
. SAVi,t-1 is the lagged gross domestic saving as 
percentage of GDP. OPENit is the level of openness of an economy or the ratio of the 
sum of import and export to GDP. M3it is the ratio of liquid assets to GDP. INFit is 
inflation rate based on GDP deflator and IR is real interest rate. GCONit is the 
government consumption as percentage of GDP.  
24. The difference between FE and RE is that the RE model assumes no 
correlation between the regressors and ci. If the assumption is correct, together with 
assumptions on the idiosyncratic error, the RE is more efficient than the FE. Otherwise, 
the RE is not consistent but the FE is. When estimating this model we try both FE and 
RE and test for the one that fits the data better and report results accordingly25. Besides 
we also test for the exogeneity of the regressors26
As we can see in the Table 3.2, the IEF, FHI and EBRD are highly correlated. 
Therefore they are entered to the regression equation separately
. The test results reject the hypothesis 
that OPENit, M3it, INFit, IRit, GCONit are endogenous. We always report results which 
are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. In the literature, static panel 
models have been used before to study determinants of investment (Mueller and Peev, 
2007; Ghura and Goodwin, 2000; and Odedokun, 1997). 
27
                                                 
23 Use of real GDP per capita growth rate does not change the result. 
. For estimation with 
24 We also estimated a dynamic panel model by differenced GMM two step robust method but the lagged 
dependent variable is not significant though Sargan test confirms validity of instruments and there is no 
second order serial correlation. 
25 Hausman test is often used to determine the choice of RE or FE but Hausman test is not robust to 
heteroskedasticity of the error term. We use a robust method suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.290) 
which is done by “xtoverid” command in STATA. 
26 Under strict exogeneity, γ should not be significant in the regression it it it ity x wβ γ ε∆ = ∆ + + ∆
where wit is a subset of xit (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 285). 
27 When any pair of them is used in a regression at least one variable becomes insignificant. 
Consequently, they are used separately. 
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IEF and its individual indexes we use the data for the period 1995-2007 because the IEF 
is only available from 1995. For estimation with FHI, EBRD and their components the 
data is from 1990-2007 but the EBRD data is only available for 26 countries (former 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe and members of the former Soviet Union plus 
Mongolia). Because of missing observations our dataset is an unbalanced panel. A list 
of countries in the dataset and country averages of variables used in our regression can 
be found in the Table A3.1 of the Appendix. 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1.  Baseline results 
First, we estimate equation (3.1) with the composite measures of economic 
freedom (IEF), political freedom (FHI) and transition progress (EBRD). Table 3.3 
shows the result of the estimations.  
Table 3.3 
Regressions with inflation and interest rate  












Institution 0.11** 0.09 4.379*** 0.099** 0.012 
Lagged growth 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.135* 0.131 
Lagged saving 0.15*** 0.12* 0.099 0.125* 0.098 
Openness 0.02 0.02 -0.004 0.019 0.029 
M3/GDP 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
Inflation 0 0 0.002** 0 0 
Interest rate 0 -0.02 -0.013 -0.019 -0.011 
Government consumption 0.02 0.01 0.049 0.026 -0.024 
Constant 9.49*** 10.31*** 3.474 9.006*** 13.9*** 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE 
Number of observations 302 357 313 357 357 
R2 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.27 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
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As we can see, economic freedom and transition progress indicators are 
significant and have expected signs. The effect of EBRD measure is higher than that of 
the IEF, which is due to the fact that EBRD index is measured on a much smaller scale. 
The political freedom measure FHI is not significant but the political rights component 
(PR) is positive and significant, which suggests that more political rights is associated 
with higher investment rates. However, CL is not significant though it has an expected 
sign. Of the control variables, saving and financial development indicator (M3/GDP) 
perform well with expected and significant coefficients.  
As discussed earlier the results in Table 3.3 may be incorrect due to correlation 
between inflation and real interest rate. Hence, we estimate the model with inflation 
only and real interest rate only, and the results are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 
below. 
Table 3.4 
Regressions with inflation 
Dependent variable: investment/GDP 










Institution 0.16*** 0.136*** 2.769*** 0.11*** 0.045 
Lagged growth -0.014 0.162*** 0.112** 0.169*** 0.165*** 
Lagged saving 0.129** 0.126*** 0.108*** 0.131*** 0.115*** 
OPEN 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.019 
M3/GDP 0.102*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 
Inflation -0.001 0 0.002* 0 0 
Government consumption  0.105 -0.073 -0.075 -0.096 -0.119 
Constant 6.449* 12.24*** 11.277*** 13.2*** 21.26*** 
Est. method FE FE RE FE RE 
No. of obs. 325 408 361 408 408 
R2 0.3 0.31 0.29 0.3 0.28 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
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Regressions with interest rate 
Dependent variable: investment/GDP 
  IEF FHI EBRD PR  CL 
Institution 0.153** 0.087 4.018*** 0.087 0.013 
Lagged growth -0.012 0.13 0.014 0.13 0.127 
Lagged saving 0.14** 0.117* 0.102* 0.117* 0.099 
Openness 0.02 0.021 -0.004 0.021 0.028 
M3/GDP 0.106*** 0.094*** 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.105*** 
Interest rate 0.003 -0.017 -0.023 -0.017 -0.014 
Government 
consumption 
0.137 0.013 0.034 0.013 -0.026 
Constant 4.633 10.348*** 4.921 10.348*** 14.012*** 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE 
Number of observations 302 357 313 357 357 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.27 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
 The first thing to note is that we have strong consistency across various 
specifications. Both inflation rate and interest rate are not significant in any 
specification but we have the most significant results when only inflation is used. This 
is our preferred specification28
According to Table 3.4, on average a ten point increase in the composite 
measure of economic freedom, all else equal, is associated with 1.6% increase in the 
investment rate and an additional point in political freedom (a lower score of FHI by 
one point) is associated with 1.36% increase in the investment rate. Of the political 
freedom measures, only the political rights have significant effect on investment but the 
inclusion of civil liberties in the political freedom measure reinforces the effect (see 
column (2) and (4) in Table 3). This may be due to the fact that we have more variation 
. 
                                                 
28 We also estimate the model without inflation but the results do not change with respect to coefficients 
of institutional variables with some reduction in R2. Models with a quadratic term of inflation are also 
estimated without any significant coefficients of inflation. Lagged inflation rate is also used in place of 
current inflation rate but the result does not change. Ghura and Goodwin (2000) do not find significant 
effect of inflation either. 
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in PR than in CL29
Lagged GDP growth rate is highly significant in all estimations except for that 
with IEF (column (1)). When political freedom or transition index are used the effect of 
lagged growth on investment is from 0.13 to 0.17, which means a 1% increase in last 
year’s growth is associated with an increase of from 0.13% to 0.17% in investment rate. 
The lagged saving rate also has significant impact on investment as expected and the 
magnitude of the impact does not change much across estimations. A 1% increase in 
lagged saving rate causes the investment to increase by from 0.11% to 0.13%. 
. If the general indicator of transition progress EBRD is one point 
higher we can expect to have an increase of 2.77% in the investment rate. Our result 
here concurs with what is found in Dawson (1998) and Ghura and Goodwin (2000) with 
regard to the effect of institutions on growth. 
In these estimations, the trade openness and inflation rate have no significant 
effects on investment rate of transition economies. The indicator of financial 
development M3/GDP is always significant and positive, which means more financial 
deepening is associated with higher investment rate. The government consumption 
expenditure has negative coefficients in all estimations but the effect is not significant.  
5.2.  Results with individual indexes 
The use of composite indexes of economic freedom aggregated from various 
components has been criticised by several authors (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) on the 
ground of the arbitrariness of weighting schemes and differences in effects of different 
freedom components30
                                                 
29 PR and CL have means of 3.85 and 3.88 and standard deviations of 2.21 and 1.77 respectively. 
. Therefore, one question we want to answer is which individual 
economic freedoms and transition indicators have significant effect on investment and 
30 Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002) find that only legal structure, private ownership and freedom to use 
alternative currency have positive and robust relation with growth. 
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which are not.  
Table 3.6 
Estimation results with nine individual economic freedoms 
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
 Business Trade Fiscal Government Monetary Investment Finance Property Corruption 
Institution 0.07* 0.034 0.036 0.017 0.018* 0.018 0.028 -0.01 0.045* 
Lagged growth 0.035 0.016 0.003 0.022 0.008 0.03 0.027 0.027 0.022 
Lagged saving 0.135** 0.149** 0.154*** 0.146** 0.14** 0.143** 0.144** 0.148*** 0.149** 
OPEN 0.022 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.017 
M3/GDP 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.12*** 0.122*** 0.118*** 
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Government 
consumption 
0.069 0.108 0.086 0.092 0.127 0.102 0.108 0.099 0.088 
Constant 9.52** 11.56*** 11.69*** 12.65*** 12.83 12.23*** 12.24*** 13.87*** 12.18 
Est. method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
No. of obs. 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
 
Table 3.6 shows results of estimations with nine individual economic 
freedoms31
                                                 
31 We do not use labour freedom because data for labour freedom is only available from 2005. 
. To our surprise, of the nine economic freedoms, we find that only three 
have significant effect on investment rate: business freedom, monetary freedom and 
freedom from corruption. The result shows that when individual freedoms are 
considered they do not have strong effect on investment because each of them does not 
make a considerable difference to the investment environment. However, when they 
stand together in the form of a composite indicator (IEF) they have a significant joint 
effect on investment. This calls for improvement of the quality of economic institutions 
in all aspects in order to promote investment (an expectedly growth). With regard to 
other explanatory variables the same results emerge in Table 3.6. Financial depending is 
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consistently significant and positive while trade openness, inflation and government 
consumption are not significant. 
Table 3.7 shows estimation results when individual transition indicators are 
used. All of them, except price liberalization, have a significant and positive effect on 
investment rate. The result of price liberalization is unexpected because it is one of the 
most advocated topics in transition reform. Among the transition indicators large scale 
privatization has the highest effect on investment rate. The reason may be that large 
scale privatization is a strong signal of commitment to restructuring of an economy and 
determination to develop a market economy, which stimulates investment from private 
sector. In addition, large scale privatization is an important source of revenue for 
governments to carry out their development programmes. Progress in reforming 
securities market and non-financial institutions have the smallest effect on investment. 
It may reflect the fact that financial market in transition economies are still in the 
very initial stage of development and they are mostly dependent on the banking system 
to cater for their investment needs (Mueller and Peev, 2007). Once again, financial 
development in form of the ratio of liquid assets to GDP has positive and significant 
effect on investment rate. 
5.3.  Results with principal components and factors 
In Tables 3.3-3.5 we use indexes of economic freedom and liberalization which 
are aggregated by equal weighting. Because arbitrary weighting schemes may not 
appropriately reflect the magnitude or even the direction of each individual element’s 
marginal impact (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) we use principal components analysis 
(PCA) to construct composite measures of freedom that best reflect the original data.  
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Estimation results for eight EBRD individual transition indicators 
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
  Large scale 
privatization  















Securities market and 
non-financial 
institutions 
Institution 2.812*** 1.681** 1.773* 0.626 1.223* 2.328** 1.563*** 1.374** 
Lagged growth 0.092** 0.11* 0.141*** 0.167*** 0.136*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.135*** 
Lagged saving 0.101** 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.096** 0.108*** 0.104*** 
OPEN -0.01 0.009 0.015 0.02 0.018 0.008 0.012 0.014 
M3/GDP 0.075** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.057** 0.058*** 0.057** 
Inflation 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 
Government consumption -0.068 -0.087 -0.114 -0.131 -0.095 -0.062 -0.096 -0.117 
Constant 12.21 12.58*** 14.96*** 16.17*** 13.64 13.87 15.23*** 16.57*** 
Est. method FE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE 
No. of obs. 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 
R2 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
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The PCA helps reduce the dimensionality of the data while retains the maximum 
variation of the underlying variables. More importantly, the PCA does not impose any 
subjective judgement but combine variables together according to their relative 
variance. Moreover, by construction the principal components are independent of each 
other. Usually, the number of principal components to retain for estimation is 
determined by the parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average partial 
correlation analysis. Another “rule of thumb” is the Kaiser’s eigenvalue>1 but it is not 
very popular. 
After applying the PCA for nine IEF variables and eight EBRD variables and 
selecting the number of components according to those methods, we come up with two 
principal components (PC1 and PC2) for both the economic freedom measures and the 
liberalization indexes. The reason is because for the economic freedom data Velicer’s 
method suggests one, while the parallel analysis and Kaiser’s eigenvalue suggest nine, 
which is not meaningful. For the EBRD data the Velicer’s method suggests two while 
the parallel analysis and the Kaiser’s eigenvalue indicate that two components should be 
used.  
Though principal component analysis has a nice property of allowing the data to 
determine both the proper magnitude and sign for aggregating the elements into a single 
index, this method is not without caveat which is the difficulty in interpreting the 
coefficients of the components because they are not chosen on the basis of any 
relationship to the explained variable. In order to make sense of the components we 
need to look at the relation between them and the underlying variables whose 
relationship with the explained variable are better known to us. Table 3.8 shows the 
eigenvectors of the components we retain. The left panel is for the first two components 
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of the IEF data and the right panel is for those of the EBRD data.  
 
Table 3.8 
Eigenvectors of principal components (PC1 and PC2) 
 IEF  EBRD 
Variable PC1 PC2 Variable PC1 PC2 
BIZF 0.2609 -0.0416 LSPRI 0.3891 0.1627 
TRAF 0.1811 0.0711 SSPRI 0.4284 -0.186 
FISF -0.0176 0.2881 RESTRU 0.2927 0.2772 
GOV -0.4076 0.4608 PLIB 0.3277 -0.4889 
MONF 0.274 0.8098 TRA_FOREX 0.4757 -0.4339 
INVF 0.418 -0.0259 COMPET 0.2262 0.35 
FINF 0.4949 0.1109 BANK_IR 0.3582 0.2697 
PROPF 0.3813 -0.1659 SECU 0.2574 0.4895 
CORF 0.3044 -0.0388    
 
Concerning the IEF data, the first component is strongly and positively related to 
investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption but 
it is strongly and negatively related to freedom of government. If we have higher score 
for this component it can be attributed to either advance in investment freedom, 
financial freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption or less freedom from 
government. If the coefficient of this component is positive and significant we can say 
that more involvement of the government in the economy is associated with higher 
investment rate, which is not surprising given that we use total investment measure. The 
second IEF component is dominated by monetary freedom and freedom from 
government. Concerning the EBRD data, the first component is positively and strongly 
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correlated with all measures of liberalisation. It can be seen as representing the overall 
liberalization progress. The second EBRD component is positively related to 
liberalisation scores in securities market, banking and interest rate and level of 
competition but negatively related to liberalisation scores in terms of price and trade and 
foreign exchange. So it can be thought of as a contrast between financial sector 
liberalisation and price liberalisation. We have seen that price liberalisation alone does 
not have significant effect on investment while other liberalisation indexes do in Table 
3.7. 
Table 3.9 
Estimation results with first two components (PC1 and PC2) of IEF and EBRD 
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
Variable IEF EBRD 
PC1 0.037** 1.366*** 
PC2 0.014 0.34 
Lagged growth 0.003 0.085* 
Lagged saving 0.131** 0.102** 
OPEN 0.012 -0.008 
M3/GDP 0.106*** 0.077*** 
Inflation -0.002 0.002** 
Government consumption  0.14 -0.036 
Constant 9.394*** 8.218* 
Estimation method FE FE 
No. of obs. 325 361 
R2 0.29 0.3 
PC1 and PC2 are first two components retained from the principal component analysis of the 
underlying IEF and EBRD variables. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
Using these principal components for regression we obtain the results as 
presented in the Table 3.9. As we can see the first components of both IEF and EBRD 
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data are positive and significant while both of the second components are not. The 
results for economic freedom is reassuring when the simple average index is significant 
but just some of individual variables are (Table 3.3 and 3.4). The result for the EBRD 
components confirms the importance of liberalisation, including price liberalisation. An 
increase in any liberalisation measures will lead to considerably higher score for the 
first EBRD principal component and this is associated with higher investment rate. With 
regard to control variables we have similar results as compared to previous 
specifications.  
Another method to reduce data dimension is factor analysis. The difference 
between principal component analysis and factor analysis is that principal component 
method uses all variability in an item while factors analysis uses only the variability in 
an item that it has in common with the other items for identifying a latent structure. 
Often, factor analysis is seen as a better tool to detect the underlying structure of the 
data and more accurate (Widaman, 1993). In an attempt to add robustness to this study 
we perform factor analysis to nine economic freedom indexes and eight EBRD 
transition indexes to extract factors for regression analysis. Different criteria also 
suggest that two factors should be retained for both economic freedom and transition 
progress. Usually, after factor analysis researchers use rotation methods to simplify and 
clarify the data structure in order to have a clearer picture of the relationship between 
the factors and the underlying variables. However, there are cases in which we can 
interpret the factors in terms of underlying variables without rotation. Here, we try to 
use both rotated and unrotated factors. Rotation techniques are either orthogonal or 
oblique but oblique rotation is often preferred because there are no ex ante reasons to 
believe that factors are not correlated.  
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Loadings on rotated and unrotated factors of IEF and EBRD 
IEF indexes EBRD indexes 
 F1 F2 F3 F4  F1 F2 F3 F4 
BIZF 0.803 0.018 0.743 0.119 LSPRI 0.909 0.018 0.414 0.342 
TRAF 0.473 0.221 0.101 0.378 SSPRI 0.906 0.211 0.158 0.687 
FISF -0.070 0.624 0.153 0.095 RESTRU 0.935 -0.161 0.770 0.084 
GOV -0.623 0.472 -0.143 -0.121 PLIB 0.794 0.357 -0.068 0.954 
MONF 0.267 0.541 -0.030 0.138 TRA_FOREX 0.886 0.302 0.076 0.820 
INVF 0.818 0.103 0.918 -0.067 COMPET 0.844 -0.275 0.886 0.054 
FINF 0.806 0.250 0.647 0.077 BANK_IR 0.939 -0.100 0.700 0.150 
PROPF 0.870 -0.169 0.686 0.142 SECU 0.835 -0.336 0.984 -0.088 
CORF 0.780 -0.082 0.246 0.105           
Note: F1 and F2 are the first two unrotated factors; F3 and F4 are the first two rotated factors using 
oblique rotation. 
 
Table 3.10 shows the relationships between the two rotated and unrotated factors 
and the economic freedom and transition indexes. When no rotation is used the factors 
have high loadings from many indexes, which makes it difficult to identify a common 
concept covering those indexes. When rotation is applied we can see a clearer pattern of 
relationship between the factors and indexes. For economic freedom, we can see that F3 
is defined by investment freedom and business freedom while F4 is defined by trade 
freedom. For transition progress, F3 is defined by scores for securities markets and 
competition while F4 is characterized by price liberalization and liberalization in trade 
and foreign exchange. The IEF’s F3 can be thought of as an indicator of the economic 
institution that supports entrepreneurship. The EBRD’s F4 can be generalized as an 
index of price liberalization. Using these factors for estimation we get the results 
reported in Table 3.11. 
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Because oblique-rotated factors are by definition correlated they are not used in 
the same regression equation32
We are more interested in models with rotated factors and all of them are 
significant and positive as expected. Previous results show that business freedom and 
investment freedom, in isolation, can hardly have significant effect on investment but 
when they are combined in a single measure (IEF Factor 3) they do have significant 
effect on investment (column 4). The IEF’s F4 is a puzzle since it largely defined by 
trade freedom which is not significant alone. Here, in contrast to the results in Table 3.7, 
we see that price liberalization can serve as an important driver of investment. However, 
price liberalization must be accompanied by other transition measures as well. This 
suggests that the results in Table 3.7 may be affected by missing variable problem. 
. In general the results are similar to those obtained by 
using principal components. We have positive and significant effects of institutional 
indicators on investment rate. If we use unrotated factors then both IEF’s F1 and F2 are 
significant (column 1-3) while only EBRD’s F1 is significant. Property rights index 
loads the most on the unrotated IEF factor 1 which has a positive and significant effect 
on investment. This shows that property rights are really important if investment is to be 
increased to achieve higher rate or growth. 
 
                                                 
32 In fact, correlation between IEF’s F3 and F4 is 0.95 and between EBRD’s F3 and F4 is 0.83, which 
reflects the fact that underlying indexes are correlated. 
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Estimation with IEF and EBRD unrotated (F1 and F2) and rotated (F3 and F4) factors 
 Economic freedom EBRD transition progress 




















Factor 1 1.741** 1.843**  1.569*  2.376*** 2.318***  1.958**  
Factor 2 0.954*  1.007*  2.807*** 0.149  -0.32  2.261** 
Lagged growth -0.004 0.028 -0.006 0.029 -0.001 0.111** 0.111** 0.165*** 0.119*** 0.122** 
Lagged saving 0.129** 0.138** 0.14** 0.136** 0.14** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 
Openness 0.011 0.02 0.007 0.02 0.014 0.007 0.007 0.022 0.009 0.01 
M3/GDP 0.106*** 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.121*** 0.097*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.06** 0.056** 0.073*** 
Inflation -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.002* 0.001* 0 0.001 0.002* 
Government consumption 0.113 0.101 0.111 0.097 0.109 -0.074 -0.075 -0.136 -0.084 -0.083 
Constant 14.802*** 13.325*** 14.921*** 13.316*** 14.623*** 18.448*** 18.56*** 18.834*** 19.04*** 17.869*** 
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE RE 
Number of observations 325 325 325 325 325 361 361 361 361 361 
R2 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.28 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).
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6.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Investment is the vehicle of growth and efficiency. Without investment growth 
cannot be sustained. More importantly, investment is the channel of “creative 
destruction” that both raises production capacity and improves efficiency. For transition 
countries investment plays a very important role because they need to restructure their 
economies to shift production from central planning to market economy. Therefore, it is 
important to understand what drives investment in transition economies. 
This chapter shows that institutional factors play a significant role in explaining 
investment differences. In general, higher degree of both economic and political 
freedoms is associated with higher ratio of investment to GDP. However, it should be 
stressed that one individual aspect of economic institution alone would not make much 
difference. It is the overall bettering of the economic institutions that matters in 
inducing investment. However, seems that investment and business freedoms may be 
emphasized as key aspects of economic institutions that can strongly drive investment.  
As far as political freedom is concerned political rights are seems to be more 
important than civil liberties in promoting investment. Since many studies have 
confirmed that institutions have significant effect on growth, even after controlling for 
investment, and given the fact that investment has been found to have significant effect 
on growth, our results further strengthen the argument for institutions as significant 
factors in explaining economic growth. This is in line with Dawson’s (1998) claim that 
institutions affect growth directly through total factor productivity and indirectly 
through investment.  
In addition, this chapter shows that those who are ahead in the transition process 
have higher investment rate, especially with regard to large scale privatization and price 
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liberalization. This should be an encouragement for transition countries that are still 
lagging behind in the race to building a mature market economy. Last but not least, 
domestic saving and financial development is crucial if transition countries are to boost 
investment and achieve healthy growth. In general, the findings in this chapter are in 
line with previous findings in the literature on determinants of investment. Our findings 
are robust to different measures of institutions and specifications. Of course, they are 
may be questioned on the ground of data quality and the general implications should be 
viewed in the context of transition economies. 
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 CHAPTER IV- EFFECTS OF BANK OWNERSHIP ON BANK 
LENDING - THE CASE OF INDIA 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
Traditional macroeconomic models such as the IS-LM assume that monetary 
policy affects the real economy by changing interest rates which, in turn, affects the 
investment demand of the firms. This line of argument has increasingly come under 
scrutiny. To begin with, there is evidence to suggest that investment decisions of firms 
are affected much more by factors such as cash flows rather than by the cost of 
borrowing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Further, there is evidence to suggest that 
banks are not passive intermediaries between the central bank and end users of money 
such as the firms. For example, in an early discussion of this issue, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) demonstrate that the composition of banks’ portfolios changes 
systematically in response to monetary policy initiatives. They conclude that the impact 
of monetary policy on the investment of firms is not entirely demand driven, and that at 
least part of it can be explained by the supply side or the bank lending channel. Kashyap 
and Stein (1995) demonstrate that if a central bank pursues tighter monetary policy, 
there is a decline in the amount of bank loans to firms and simultaneously a rise in the 
issuance of commercial paper, and conclude that contractionary monetary policy reduce 
loan supply. 
 Research suggests that there might be significant heterogeneity in the reaction of 
banks to monetary policy initiatives. Peek and Rosengren (1995) argue that an 
important determinant of a bank’s reaction is its capital-to-asset ratio. If banks find it 
difficult (or expensive) to raise capital, for example, they would be reluctant to lend 
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even if there is ample demand for credit in the aftermath of easing of monetary policy. 
This hypothesis finds significant support in the empirical literature. Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) find that monetary policy affects most banks that are small and undercapitalised. 
Gambacorta (2005) too finds that lending of undercapitalized Italian banks is adversely 
affected by contractionary monetary policy, even though lending is not correlated with 
bank size. Further, there is a directional asymmetry in the impact of monetary policy on 
the lending behaviour of undercapitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). In the event 
of contractionary monetary policy, there is a sharp tightening in loan disbursal by 
undercapitalised banks, but in the event of an expansionary monetary policy there is no 
corresponding expansion of credit disbursal.  
 The reaction of banks to monetary policy would also depend on the composition 
of their assets. The traditional or money view of monetary policy transmission assumes 
that all asset classes are perfect substitutes of each other. If, therefore, contractionary 
monetary policy leads to a reduction in deposits, a bank is capable of substituting for 
this loss of deposits dollar for dollar, using other assets like CDs, such that loan supply 
would not be affected. Stein (1998) argues that, contrary to this view, assets included in 
a bank’s balance sheet are not perfect substitutes. For example, since deposits are 
guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (or its overseas counterpart), 
while CDs are not, there may be adverse selection in the market for CDs, such that 
banks will not use these instruments to compensate for loss of deposits dollar for dollar. 
This would result in a decline in loan supply. It follows that banks that have less liquid 
assets such that it cannot quickly and costlessly compensate for loss of deposits in the 
event of contractionary monetary policy or, alternatively, those that cannot raise funds 
quickly to the same end, would react more to monetary policy changes. Kashyap and 
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Stein (2000) find that monetary policy has greater impact on loan supply of small banks 
and banks with low securities-to-assets ratios. 
 The literature does not, however, examine the impact of bank ownership on the 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This is hardly surprising, given that 
much of the literature is based on the United States and Western European experiences, 
where private ownership of banks overwhelmingly dominates. However, as pointed out 
by La Porta et al. (2002), state-ownership of banks is ubiquitous in much of the world, 
especially in emerging markets. Indeed, the 2008-09 financial crisis has led to 
emergence of significant state ownership of banking assets in countries such as the 
United Kingdom, and concerns about the lending activities of the de facto nationalised 
banks have brought into focus the impact of bank ownership on the lending channel in 
the developed country context as well. This chapter tries to address this gap in the 
literature and examine whether the impact of monetary policy on lending differs across 
banks depending on their ownership. 
 India is a fast growing emerging market that embraced the market economy in 
the early nineties and has since liberalised its economy substantially. Importantly, in the 
absence of a well developed market for corporate bonds,33 banks are by far the largest 
source of credit for Indian companies,34
                                                 
33 Corporate bonds account for only 3 percent of the Indian bond market (Asuncion-Mund, 2007). 
 and hence bank lending plays an important role 
in the transmission of monetary policy in India. The Indian banking sector is also 
marked by the presence of a number of state-owned and private-owned (including 
foreign) banks, who compete on a level playing field. The state-owned banks 
themselves have autonomy regarding lending decisions, and many of them have sold 
shares to private (and even foreign) shareholders, thereby opening themselves up to 
34 Domestic credit provided by banking sector increased from 44.1% in 1995 to 64.2% of GDP in 2007 
(World Bank Development Indicators, 2008). 
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greater scrutiny. The state-owned banks are somewhat less efficient than their privately 
owned counterparts (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). However, evidence suggests that, 
contrary to the popular wisdom about state-owned companies, ownership does not 
significantly affect profitability of Indian banks (Sarkar et al., 1998; Bhaumik and 
Dimova, 2004). The state maintains an arm’s-length relationship with the banks, such 
that the banks are autonomous and focussed on profitability. In that respect, the state-
owned and privately-owned banks are similar, and hence the presumption of profit 
focus that underlies the analyses of banks in the stylised literature is applicable to all 
Indian banks. There are, nevertheless, important differences between state-owned and 
privately-owned banks in terms of their customer base (Berger et al., 2008), and also in 
terms of factors that affect their lending (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2007). Therefore, there 
are likely to be differences in ways in which the state-owned and privately-owned banks 
react to monetary policies affected by India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI). 
 The results of this chapter indicate that banks of different types respond very 
differently to monetary policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public 
and foreign banks cut back on lending following monetary tightening but others do not 
seem to react. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they 
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of 
monetary tightening. 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview 
of the banking system and the operation of monetary policy in India. Section 3 explains 
the empirical methodology and the model specification, and discusses the data. The 
results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  BANKING SECTOR AND MONETARY POLICY IN INDIA 
2.1.  Banking Sector 
Independent India inherited a weak financial system. Commercial banks 
mobilized household savings through demand and term deposits, and disbursed the 
credit primarily to large corporations (Ghosh, 1988). This lop-sided pattern of credit 
disbursal, and perhaps a spate of bank failures that reduced the number of banks from 
566 in 1951 to 90 in 1968, led the government to nationalize the banks in 1969. The 
main thrust of nationalization was social banking, with the stated objective of increasing 
the geographical coverage of the banking system, and extension of credit to the priority 
sector that comprised largely of agriculture, agro-processing, and small-scale industries. 
This phase of banking in India was characterized by administered interest rates, 
mandatory syndicated lending, and pre-emption of the banks’ deposit base by the 
government in the form of measures like the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). Banks were 
required to invest a significant proportion of their deposits in bonds issued by the 
government and “approved” (quasi-government) institutions. At the same time, between 
1969 and 1990, the nationalized banks added over 55,000 branches to their network 
(Sarkar and Agarwal, 1997). 
While the social agenda of the banking sector, measured in terms of 
geographical and sectoral coverage, was arguably a success, the Indian banking sector, 
about 88 percent of whose assets were managed by state-owned banks, was in distress. 
While the ratio of gross operating profit of the scheduled commercial banks rose from 
0.8 percent (of assets) in the seventies to 1.5 percent in the early nineties, the net profit 
of the banks declined. More importantly, perhaps, financial repression involving state-
owned banks was not in harmony with the agenda of real sector reforms that the 
Chapter IV Effects of Bank Ownership on Bank Lending 
 The Case of India 
84 
 
government of India unleashed in the aftermath of the balance of payments crisis of 
1991. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), therefore, initiated reform of the banking sector 
in 1992, based on the recommendations of Narasimham Committee I (see Reddy, 1999). 
Between 1992 and 1997, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) was reduces from 15 
percent to about 10 percent, and the statutory lending requirement (SLR) was reduced 
from 38.5 percent to 25 percent over the same period. The interest rates were gradually 
liberalized. Prior to 1992, the lending rates structure consisted of six categories based on 
the size of advances. During the 1992-94 period, the lending rates structure was 
rationalised to three categories, and in 1994 banks were given the freedom to determine 
interest rates on all loans exceeding Indian rupees (INR) 200,000 (i.e., USD 4,500). By 
1998, banks were free to determine the interest rates for all loans, with the 
understanding that the lending rates on loans up to INR 200,000 would not exceed the 
declared prime lending rates (PLR) of the banks. 
Prior to the initiation of reforms, banks were required to refer all loans above a 
size threshold to the RBI for authorization, and formation of a consortium was 
mandatory for all loans exceeding INR 50 million (about USD 1 million at currently 
exchange rate). Bank credit was delivered primarily in the form of cash credit for use as 
working capital, and there were significant restrictions on the ability of banks to deliver 
term credit for projects. Finally, the RBI implemented selective credit controls on 
“sensitive” commodities.   
In the wake of the reforms, as early as in 1993, the threshold for the mandatory 
formation of consortiums was raised from INR 50 million to INR 500 million. Further, 
banks within consortiums were permitted to frame the rules or contractual agreements 
governing the consortium lending. In 1996, selective credit controls on all sensitive 
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commodities except sugar were removed. Banks were also allowed much greater 
flexibility about the proportion of the cash credit component of the loans, the new floor 
being 25 percent. The following year witnessed further elimination of credit controls: 
Banks were no longer subjected to the instructions pertaining to Maximum Permissible 
Bank Finance (MPBF), and were allowed to evolve their own methods for assessing the 
credit needs of the potential borrowers. Further, banks were no longer required to form 
consortiums to lend in excess of INR 500 million (about USD 10 million at current 
exchange rate), and restrictions on their ability to provide term loan for projects were 
withdrawn. However, prudential regulations required that an individual bank not be 
over-exposed to any one (or group of) creditor(s). 
Finally, in 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in 
keeping with the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important 
recommendation of the Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies 
(ARCs) to simultaneously improve the quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to 
facilitate recovery of loans. In a separate development, after a prolonged period of legal 
disputes, debt recovery tribunals (DRTs) began functioning in India, in earnest, by 
1999.  
Another important aspect of the Indian banking reforms in 1990s is the opening 
up of the banking market to private and foreign entries and privatization of state-owned 
banks. New private banks and foreign banks are allowed to establish. Foreign investors 
are allowed to hold up to 74% of private banks. At the same time ownership in public 
sector banks is diversified with government shareholding reduced to 51% in many 
banks. Currently, most of the state-owned banks in our sample have been listed in 
Indian stock exchanges. 
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To summarize, by 1996, banks operating in India, were, by and large, in a 
position to take independent decisions on the composition of their asset portfolio, and 
on the choice of potential borrowers. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 
these banks, including the state-owned ones, allocated resources in a way that was 
consistent with maximization of returns.35
2.2.  Monetary Policy 
 There are, however, significant differences 
across credit market behaviour of banks of different ownership. Berger et al. (2008) find 
that comparative advantage of Indian banks with respect to relationship with potential 
borrowers varies considerably with ownership. State-owned banks typically have 
banking relationship with small firms, state-owned firms and rural firms, domestic 
private banks have comparative advantage with respect to opaque closely held firms, 
and foreign banks have banking relationship with large, listed and foreign firms. The 
likelihood of adverse selection, therefore, depends on ownership type. Bhaumik and 
Piesse (2008) demonstrate that bank ownership also has an impact on risk aversion 
among Indian banks, with foreign banks being significantly more risk averse than 
domestic banks. Since the impact of monetary policy on bank lending depends in large 
measure on the risk of adverse selection and the extent of risk aversion of banks, we 
should expect to see considerable differences in the impact of such policy on banks of 
different ownership. 
The authority to implement monetary policy in India rests with the RBI. It was 
established under the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934, as a private shareholders’ 
                                                 
35 The empirical literature on the Indian banking sector (e.g., Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004) suggests that 
the public sector banks were responding to the changed policy and competition paradigm, and that, by the 
end of the 1990s, ownership itself could no longer explain cross-sectional variations in profitability of 
banks. Since catching up with the profitability and, conversely, cost efficiency, of the private sector and 
foreign banks requires that the public sector banks be able to allocate their resources efficiently, there is 
prima facie evidence to suggest that the public sector banks too are behaving as optimizing agents. 
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bank, and was subsequently nationalised in 1949. Unlike the Bank of England, which 
was formally granted independence in 1997, the RBI does not have de jure 
independence from the Government of India. However, with the end of automatic 
monetisation of fiscal deficit by 1997, the central bank was granted de facto 
independence. There are strict limits on the ways and means advances by the RBI to the 
government, and the former does not participate in primary market auctions of 
government securities. While the RBI takes into account the federal government’s views 
about the state of the economy, it de facto sets monetary policy independently. 
 Originally, the bank rate and open market operations were the RBI’s instruments 
of choice for conducting monetary policy. In the seventies and eighties, with increased 
accommodation of the federal government’s fiscal policies by the central bank, these 
instruments lost their efficacy, and the cash reserve ratio (CRR) became the primary 
instrument for conducting monetary policy. In 1998, in light of the realisation that in an 
increasingly complex environment broad money supply in the medium term cannot be 
the sole intermediate target of monetary policy, the RBI formally adopted a multifactor 
approach to monetary policy. This resulted in a focus on the use of short term interest 
rates as the instruments of monetary policy, facilitated by the deregulation of interest 
rates, which was initiated as early as 1989. The bank rate, therefore, made a comeback 
in 1997-98, and was complemented by the rates for reverse repo (and, from 2000-01, 
repo) transactions. The repo and reverse repo rates have emerged as the primary 
instruments of monetary policy since the turn of the century. The CRR, which was 
reduced steadily from 15 percent in the early nineties to 5 percent by 2004, has not 
completely been abandoned. It is still used in situations that demand significant 
monetary response, or when other monetary policy options have been exhausted.  
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RBI monetary policy operations 
Year Bank rate (%) CRR (%) REPO (%)a Reverse REPO (%)b 
 1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 




1996-1997 12 12 0 14 10 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1997-1998 12 10.5 5 10 10.25 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5** 8 5 
1998-1999 10.5 8 3 10.25 10.5 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 6 5 
1999-2000 8 8 0 10.5 9 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 10 4 
2000-2001 8 7 4 9 8 6 11.5% 9 6 10 6 5 
2001-2002 7 6.5 1 8 5.5 3 9 8 5 6 5 6 
2002-2003 6.5 6.25 1 5.5 4.75 2 8 7 4 5 4.5 1 
2003-2004 6.25 6 1 4.75 4.5 1 6 6 1 4.5 4.75 1 
2004-2005 6 6 0 4.5 5 3 6 6 0 4.75 4.75 0 
2005-2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5 1 6 6.5 2 4.75 5.5 3 
2006-2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5.5 1 6.5 7.75 5 5.5 6 2 
Source: RBI Annual Reports 
Note: a Started in June 2000 
b Started on 27 November 1997 
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The use of all monetary policy instruments of the RBI are summarised in Table 
4.1. It is evident that it is difficult to select any one instrument as the indicator of 
monetary policy of the RBI. This poses a problem because empirical analysis requires 
the use of a single monetary policy signal; the US literature on the lending channel of 
monetary policy focuses on changes in the federal funds rate (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 
& 2000), while the European literature uses short-term interest rates (Erhmann et al., 
2001) or the refinancing rate (Gambacorta, 2005). However, Indian banks declare their 
respective prime lending rates (PLR) – the rate at which they are prepared to lend to the 
most credit-worthy borrowers – that is linked to their cost of funds. The average PLR of 
the five largest banks is quoted by the RBI. As shown in the Figure 4.1 in the Appendix, 
movements of this average PLR closely replicates movements in the CRR, bank rate, 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also the repo and reverse repo rates36
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
. Hence, we use 
the average PLR reported by the RBI as the basis for our measure of monetary policy. 
We are not alone in our use of such constructs as the basis for the measure for monetary 
policy. In the British context, Huang (2003) used the average of the base rates of 
selected banks as the indicator of monetary policy, while Hofmann and Mizen (2004) 
eschewed the official Bank of England rate in favour of the average of the base rates of 
four major clearing banks. 
In the traditional IS-LM model, a reduction in money supply is immediately 
translated into a higher equilibrium interest rate in the money market, and this in turn 
affects the real sector through a reduction in investment. On a bank’s balance sheet, a 
                                                 
36 The coefficients of correlation between the PLR and the CRR, bank rate and repo rate are 0.94, 0.97 
and 0.56 respectively.  
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reduction in deposits on the liability side is matched by a reduction in the bank’s 
holding of bonds and loans on the asset side. If bonds and loans are perfect substitutes, 
as in the traditional Keynesian framework, there would be proportionate reduction in the 
bonds and loans portfolios. The impact of monetary policy on the asset composition of 
the banks (and the firms, the borrowers) is of no interest. 
Now, suppose that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes. For example, at 
least some of the banks might find it easier to both build up and unwind their loan 
portfolios than their bond portfolios. In the presence of such imperfections in capital 
market access, a contractionary monetary policy is likely to be followed by a much 
greater reduction in loan supply than in sale of (or a drop in the demand for) bonds.37
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there can be considerable cross-sectional 
variation in the nature of bank’s reaction to monetary policy. Banks with strong 
linkages with their corresponding borrower pools, with resultant amelioration of the 
informational asymmetry and hence credit risk, might downsize (or reduce the growth 
of) their loan portfolios less in response to contractionary monetary policy than other 
banks. On the other hand, less capitalised banks and smaller banks that find it more 
difficult to raise capital might cut back on lending (or reduce lending growth) far more 
than larger and well-capitalised banks. Since these cross-sectional variations affect only 
the supply side of the loan market – the banks and not the firms that demand credit – 
 
The literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission takes this 
change in the asset composition of banks into consideration.  
                                                 
37 Alternatively, if bonds are safer than loans, which is often the case in developing countries where the 
main issuer of bonds are the sovereign governments, a monetary contraction initiated by a central bank 
might trigger a flight to the less risky asset, with banks downsizing their loans portfolios much more 
aggressively than their bonds portfolios (Bernanke et al., 1994; Ashcraft and Campello, 2002). This is the 
so-called balance sheet channel of monetary transmission that, together with the bank lending channel, 
comprises the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. 
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they can be used to circumvent identification problem of empirical modelling of the 
bank lending channel, i.e., distinguishing between the demand and supply side effects of 
monetary policy on the amount of loans disbursed.  
In keeping with the literature, the theoretical basis for which can be found in 
Ehrman et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we model change in loans 
disbursed by bank i (yi) as a function of the change in the monetary policy instrument 
(MP) – the average PLR of the five largest Indian banks in our case. Given the 
aforementioned cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ response to monetary policy 
based on their characteristics, we control for three different bank characteristics in our 
specification, namely, liquidity (LIQ), capitalisation (CAP) and profitability (PROFIT). 
This is consistent with the stylised literature (Gambacorta, 2005). In light of the 
evidence that suggests that bank behaviour in India can be affected by being subjected 
to market scrutiny (see Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), we also include in our specification 
a dummy variable (LISTING) that takes the value 1 if a bank is listed at one of the 
country’s stock exchanges. Finally, in order to further facilitate identification to 
distinguish between loan demand and loan supply, we include industrial growth (IND) 
that affects the demand for funds much more than banks’ behaviour.38
Our base specification, therefore, is as follows: 
 
 ∆yit = α + β∆MPt-1 + γ1∆CAPi,t-1 + γ2∆LIQi,t-1 + γ3PROFITi,t-1 + γ4LISTINGi,t 
  + γ5INDt-1 + µi + εit       (4.1) 
                                                 
38 In the literature, the controls for loan demand usually are GDP growth rate and the inflation rate, 
sometimes used together in the specification. However, there is evidence to suggest that in the Indian 
context bank’s behaviour is influenced more by industrial growth than by GDP growth (Bhaumik and 
Piesse, 2008), and hence our choice. We also experimented with specifications that included the inflation 
rate, in isolation as well as together with the industrial growth rate. The coefficient of inflation was never 
significant, and hence we do not report that specification in the thesis. 
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where t represents time, i the index of bank, µi is the bank-specific fixed effect and εit is 
the i.i.d. error term. In the literature, bank lending models are usually estimated using 
quarterly data. Since a change in monetary policy in quarter t is likely to affect disbursal 
in bank loans with at least a one-period lag, ∆yit is modelled as a function of monetary 
policy in the previous four quarters. However, in the Indian context, only annual data 
are available for banks, such that the time unit of analysis is a year, as opposed to a 
quarter. Therefore, we assume that a change in monetary policy in a given year will 
affect loans disbursal of the following year. Hence, we model ∆yit as a function of 
∆MPi,t-1, the lagged change in the monetary policy indicator.  
 Our empirical approach is different from the literature in several ways. Since our 
study focuses on the differences in the reactions of banks with different ownership to 
monetary policy, we interact bank ownership dummies with ∆MPi,t-1. Second, we argue 
that a given change in interest rates cannot have the same impact in a tight and an easy 
monetary regime; a 50 basis point increase in the interest is likely to have a very 
different impact on loan disbursal when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 8 
percent, compared to the case when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 2 
percent. Hence, we further interact the ∆MPi,t-1 variable with an indicator of the nature 
of the monetary regime. In other words, our regression estimates identify the impact of 
monetary policy on loan disbursal for banks of each ownership type, in each monetary 
regime. In order to facilitate this process further, following Huang (2003), we include 
interactions between ∆MPi,t-1 and indicators of both of these type of regimes: a dummy 
Chapter IV Effects of Bank Ownership on Bank Lending 
 The Case of India 
93 
 
variable MCI that takes the value 1 in an easy monetary regime, and its inverse IMCI 
that takes the value 1 in a tight monetary regime39
 The resultant specification is as follows: 
.  
∆yit = Σjαj(IMCIt-1 × ∆MPt-1 × OWNjit) + Σjβj(MCIt-1 × ∆MPt-1 × OWNjit) + γ1∆CAPi,t-1 + 
γ2∆LIQi,t-1 + γ3PROFITi,t-1 + γ4LISTINGit + γ5INDt-1 + µi + εit       (4.2) 
where OWN is a dummy variable capturing type of bank ownership and j is the index of 
the types of bank ownership.  
 This equation represents a collection of baseline equations that are estimated for 
each bank group in each monetary regime while setting dummies for other bank groups 
to zero. So if the coefficient αj of IMCIt-1× ∆MPi,t-1×OWNjit  is negative it means when 
the last period regime is tight banks of that ownership type j would lower their lending 
if there was an increase in last period monetary indicator MP. Similarly, if the 
coefficient βj of MCIt-1×∆MPt-1×OWNjit is negative it means when the last period regime 
is easy banks of ownership type j would decrease their lending if MP rate increased in 
the past period. 
The data for the estimation are obtained from a number of sources. Bank balance 
sheets are obtained from the Indian Banks’ Association. Using these financial 
statements, we are able to measure the change in loan disbursal by each bank during 
each financial year (∆yit). We measure CAP as the log of capital and reserves, LIQ as 
the log of liquid assets, and PROFIT as the return on assets. The information about year 
of stock exchange listing of banks is obtained from the Prowess database marketed by 
                                                 
39 This approach is also used by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) to estimate the asymmetric effect of cash 
flow on investment in a monetary tightening and by Vermeulen (2000) to estimate the additional financial 
accelerator effect in periods of recessions. 
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the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The ownership types of the banks40
An MCI is a weighted average of the change in the domestic interest rates and 
exchange rates relative to their values on a pre-specified base date. The weights could 
be derived from empirical economic models that estimate the impact of these variables 
on either aggregate demand or prices. When the MCI is positive (negative) the monetary 
condition is said to be tight (easy). While there are doubts about the use of MCIs as an 
operational tool it is widely accepted that MCIs can serve as an important indicator of 
monetary stance (Hyder and Khan, 2007; Kannan et al., 2006). According to the 
Kannan et al.’ (2006) estimation the weights of interest rate and exchange rate are equal 
0.58 and 0.42 respectively, suggesting a more important role of interest rate for the 
macroeconomic environment. This MCI turns out to explain the monetary policy 
environment better than either interest rate or exchange rate does independently when 
matched with actual past macroeconomic episodes of the Indian economy.  
 – 
public sector, old domestic private, new domestic private, and foreign – are obtained 
from the RBI. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the central bank is also the source for 
our measure of monetary policy. We measure ∆MPit as the change in the yearly average 
of the aforementioned PLR. Finally, the indicators of easy and tight monetary regime 
are obtained from the monetary conditions index (MCI) estimated by Kannan et al. 
(2006).  
                                                 
40 The nature of public sector (or state-owned) and foreign banks are easily understood, even though it 
should be noted that private investors own minority shares in a number of public sector banks. The 
distinction between the two types of domestic private banks is more complex. The old domestic private 
banks were in operation much before the initiation of the financial reforms in the early 1990s. They were 
typically closely held, often by members of trading communities. Subsequent to the reforms, many of 
these banks have floated themselves on stock exchanges and have expanded beyond their traditional 
geographical enclaves. The new private banks came into existence after the financial reforms paved the 
way for market entry for new banks. Many of them have links to large former or existing non-bank 
financial institutions. These de novo banks by and large have professional management, almost always 
are stock exchange listed, and have expanded their shares of the deposit and loans markets aggressively. 
For further details, see Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) and Bhaumik and Dimova (2004). 
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Following Bhaumik and Piesse (2008), we include in our sample banks with at 
least two branches. This primarily leads to exclusion of foreign banks that have a sole 
branch in India to finance trading activities of their respective client multinationals. We 
also exclude from our sample banks that experienced very large changes to their balance 
sheets, often on account of acquisition of non-banking assets of other financial 
organisations, or on account of financial distress. Our final sample consists of 58 banks, 
and the data covers the 2000-07 period, resulting in over 300 bank-year observations 
(we lose one year of data due to lagging). Of these banks, 24 are public sector banks, 21 
are old private sector banks, 3 are new private sector banks and 10 are foreign banks. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression model are reported in Table 
4.2.  
In general, Indian public banks are much larger than private banks. Indian public 
banks’ lending grows faster than that of private banks but private banks’ lending growth 
under tight regime is higher than their lending growth under easy regime. Term-wise 
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Summary statistics by bank ownership and monetary regime 
Variable  Public banks Private banks 
  All Easy  Tight  All Easy Tight  
Level and ratio        
Total assets Mean 52846.43 57588.06 49290.21 7834.33 8675.76 7216 
 Std. Dev. 75552.61 80082.95 72190.76 8978.79 9257.59 8752.08 
Capital and reserves Mean 2712.99 2981.494 2511.611 564.76 654.084 498.44 
 Std. Dev. 3822.872 4022.267 3674.706 772.78 811.65 738.74 
Liquid assets Mean 22302.41 25337.98 20025.74 2713.12 3130.53 2412.71 
 Std. Dev. 35251.67 39345.45 31863.85 2905.52 3109.8 2721.66 
Advances Mean 23474.7 25374.02 22050.21 3719.32 4142.14 3408.61 
 Std. Dev. 32289.41 31536.51 32934.94 4422.98 4466.68 4381.54 
















 Std. Dev. 34877.7 34350.24 35375.83 4945.26 5222.77 4717.16 
Short-term advances Mean 8926.752 9535.028 8423.351 1943.48 2187.42 1750.68 
 Std. Dev. 12004.92 12821.93 11334.99 2382.46 2630.69 2157.79 
Medium-term advances Mean 8206.04 8555.75 7916.62 1093.68 1121.28 1071.86 
 Std. Dev. 11223.34 9452.559 12548.61 1435.51 1343.57 1509.26 
ROA (%) Mean 0.96 1.13 0.832 1.1 0.794 1.32 
 Std. Dev. 0.78 0.378 0.969 1.88 1.845 1.89 
Listing on stock 
exchanges Mean 0.65 0.750 0.583 0.64 0.65 0.64 
 Std. Dev. 0.48 0.436 0.496 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Growth         
Δ log of advances Mean 0.197 0.201 0.193 0.157 0.132 0.175 
 Std. Dev. 0.118 0.136 0.104 0.196 0.195 0.195 
Δ log of advances, 















 Std. Dev. 0.127 0.145 0.112 0.193 0.189 0.193 
Δ log of short-term 
advances Mean 0.189 0.167 0.213 0.140 0.129 0.149 
 Std. Dev. 0.212 0.187 0.237 0.324 0.321 0.328 
Δ log of medium-term 
advances Mean 0.190 0.188 0.193 0.102 0.012 0.177 
 Std. Dev. 0.266 0.204 0.325 0.631 0.669 0.589 
Δ log of capital and 
reserves Mean 0.152 0.175 0.134 0.159 0.150 0.166 
 Std. Dev. 0.143 0.157 0.129 0.186 0.196 0.179 
Δ log of liquid assets Mean 0.103 0.126 0.086 0.091 0.078 0.100 
 Std. Dev. 0.131 0.107 0.144 0.238 0.250 0.228 
All level variables are in Indian rupee crores (10 millions). Liquid assets include cash, balances with RBI and other banks, money 
at call and short notice, government and other approved securities. Short-term means less than 1 year and medium-term means 
from 1 year up to 3 years. 
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4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We start our empirical exercise by estimating the baseline equation for all banks 
with no regard for monetary regime. This equation is normally conducted by the 
random effect (RE) or fixed effect (FE) methods but the FE method is more popular 
because the assumption of no correlation between the unobserved effect and 
explanatory variables that underlies the RE method is often seen as unrealistic. 
 Therefore, we use the FE method in this chapter to obtain consistent 
estimates41
When money regime is tight we expect that all banks will reduce their lending in 
the following year if there is a further tightening. In other words, we expect all the αs to 
be negative. However, in easy money regime a rate increase may not necessarily result 
in contraction of lending across the board. Some banks may have more customers who 
are refused by other banks. Some may have more available funds for lending thanks to 
expansionary monetary policy in previous years. In general, we cannot tell a priori the 
sign of the βs. 
. Unfortunately, the estimation for the pooled data (i.e. banks of all type and 
no regime discrimination) does not yield any significant coefficients with very small F-
statistic. This means that it is we cannot build a model for a sample of banks that are 
very heterogeneous and for both easy and tight monetary regimes. Therefore, we 




                                                 
41 We do use RE estimation but it does not detect unobserved effect while FE estimation does. We also 
try to estimate a dynamic panel model with the lag of log change of advances as an explanatory variable 
but it is never significant even though GMM assumptions are satisfied by Sargan/Hansen tests. 
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Fixed effect estimation – determinants of credit disbursal (I) 
 
Dependent variable: log change in 
advances 
Dependent variable: log change in 
advances and debentures 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Rate change x Public -0.136*** -0.133***  -0.104** -0.119**  
 (0.049) (0.043)  (0.047) (0.045)  
Rate change x Old private -0.046  -0.07 -0.042  -0.049 
 (0.048)  (0.054) (0.044)  (0.054) 
Rate change x New private -0.069  -0.096 -0.111  -0.122 
 (0.186)  (0.196) (0.149)  (0.165) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.383***  -0.399*** -0.32***  -0.324*** 
 (0.082)  (0.088) (0.093)  (0.102) 
Easy regime       
Rate change x Public 0.078 0.049  0.153* 0.174  
 (0.059) (0.058)  (0.081) (0.104)  
Rate change x Old private 0.146**  0.169** 0.165***  0.169** 
 (0.058)  (0.067) (0.056)  (0.067) 
Rate change x New private 0.1  0.063 0.054  0.012 
 (0.277)  (0.242) (0.217)  (0.19) 
Rate change x Foreign 0.06  0.119 0.096  0.127 
 (0.138)  (0.133) (0.144)  (0.137) 
Control variables       
Capital (lagged) -0.09 -0.434 0.094 -0.095 -0.417 0.054 
 (0.137) (0.255) (0.076) (0.131) (0.245) (0.09) 
Liquidity (lagged) -0.059 -0.02 -0.066 -0.042 0.015 -0.053 
 (0.059) (0.108) (0.065) (0.054) (0.117) (0.059) 
Return on assets (lagged) 0.056** 0.026 0.055** 0.054** 0.065 0.052** 
 (0.025) (0.05) (0.026) (0.024) (0.053) (0.025) 
Stock exchange listing -0.008 0.009 0.025 0.011 0.024 0.033 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.042) (0.023) (0.021) (0.05) 
Industrial growth (lagged) 0.04*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
F-statistic 5.97 11.19 2.95 4.43 5 7.74 
Prob(F-stat>0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-square 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.28 
No. of observations 334 144 190 334 144 190 
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4.3 shows estimation results when two measures of loan supply are used: 
advances (log change) and total advances, debentures and bonds (log change). Columns 
(1) and (4) are results of regressions of all banks; columns (2) and (5) are results of 
regressions of only public banks; and columns (3) and (6) are results of regressions of 
private banks only. The F-statistics show that the model as represented by the equation 
(4.2) fits the data well.  
In general, when the regime is tight it seems that all banks reduce their lending. 
We have negative α as expected for all bank types and they are significant for public 
and foreign banks. The coefficient α of foreign banks is much larger than that of the 
public banks. So, the Indian public banks are more responsive to policy shocks than 
domestic private banks but less so than foreign banks.  This result is the same for both 
measures of lending. 
This result seems to be in contrast with the Micco and Panizza’s (2006) result 
where public banks in a group of both developed and developing countries are less 
responsive to macroeconomic shocks than private banks. However, these private banks 
are both domestic and foreign owned. In addition, our result is just for period of tight 
monetary regime. The strong reaction of foreign banks suggests that they are more risk-
averse than local banks. In addition, foreign banks often have disadvantages in 
obtaining and processing information about opaque firms (Stein, 2002) and they have 
less room in terms of customer base to cushion adversary shocks42
                                                 
42 Berger et al. (2008) show that foreign banks in India tend to establish relationship with more 
transparent firms, mainly foreign and large local ones.  
. Foreign banks 
usually depend more on money market and funds from mother banks. In fact in 2006-07 
the average credit-deposit ratio of the foreign banks in the sample is 105.9% while those 
of public banks and domestic private banks (both old and new) are 65% and 61.8% 
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respectively. In the face of monetary tightening foreign banks often do not have 
relatively cheap working fund in form of deposits obtained from previous periods. 
Consequently, they have to cut back credits more sharply than domestic banks.  
In easy money regime, banks expand their business. When interest rate is raised 
banks may significantly cut back their lending or go on to supply credit if they have 
relatively cheap funds obtained from previous periods or sources other than insured 
deposits. In Table 12 we see that in easy regime when monetary condition is tightened 
Indian banks either show no reactions or disburse more credit. All the coefficient βs are 
positive and they are significant for old private sector banks and public banks (in model 
(4), though not really strongly). In other words, public and old private sector banks still 
supply more credit when they face monetary contraction given that the previous period 
regime is easy.  
There can be several explanations for this result. It may reflect the expectations 
about future state of market by old private banks and, to some extent, public sector 
banks. In easy money regime banks would expect an increase in interest rate to be 
temporary and they would expand their businesses in preparation for the future when 
conditions become favourable again. There may be some sort of strategic market 
expansion activities among the banks. When new private sector banks and foreign banks 
are following a kind of “wait and see” policy the public sector banks and old private 
banks may be more aggressive in credit disbursal in order to capture more market share. 
Another possible explanation is that old private banks have special relationship with 
their clients which are not affected by monetary policy shocks. One may argue that 
public sector banks are under some pressure to maintain the level of credit supply to 
their clients but this cannot explain why they supply substantially less credit PLR 
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increases and the previous regime is tight. This is clearly pointing to an asymmetric 
effect of monetary policy on bank lending. The result here shows some counteraction by 
old private and public banks against monetary shocks and it calls into question the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in easy monetary regime. Given that banks of different 
ownership types have different clienteles it should follow from the results here that 
monetary policies would have asymmetric effects across firms as well.  
Of the control variables, capital and liquidity have no effect on credit growth. 
However, return on assets is positive and significant across estimations except for data 
of public banks only, which means profit is an important determinant of credit supply of 
Indian banks. As expected, industrial growth has positive and significant effect on credit 
supply and the effect is similar for different bank types and measures.  
Table 4.4 presents estimation results when we use log change of short term (up 
to one year) and medium term (from one up to three years) advances as dependent 
variables. In general, we have similar pattern of banks’ response to monetary shocks in 
terms of short-term and medium-term credit supply. Under tight regime, public and 
foreign banks reduce short-term and medium-term lending significantly while domestic 
private banks do not. Foreign banks’ response is two to three times stronger than that of 
public banks, depending on the term of credit: they cut back on medium-term credit 
much more than short-term credit. This can be considered an evidence of risk-
averseness. In difficult time, banks prefer short term advances over those of longer term 
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FE estimation – determinants of credit disbursal (II) 
 
Dependent variable: log change in 
short term advances 
Dependent variable: log change in 






All banks State-owned Private sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Rate change x Public -0.171 -0.22*  -0.3** -0.069  
 (0.111) (0.116)  (0.145) (0.133)  
Rate change x Old private -0.092  -0.078 -0.194  -0.353 
 (0.124)  (0.153) (0.2)  (0.26) 
Rate change x New private 0.13  0.141 -0.391  -0.539 
 (0.317)  (0.329) (0.422)  (0.443) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.348***  -0.336** -1.02***  -1.15*** 
 (0.123)  (0.14) (0.345)  (0.347) 
Easy regime       
Rate change x Public 0.142 0.253*  0.367** 0.105  
 (0.095) (0.136)  (0.158) (0.201)  
Rate change x Old private 0.326**  0.307* 0.287  0.446 
 (0.164)  (0.173) (0.343)  (0.371) 
Rate change x New private -0.081  -0.088 0.614  0.623 
 (0.272)  (0.291) (0.522)  (0.48) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.15  -0.141 0.552  0.721 
 (0.449)  (0.514) (0.733)  (0.784) 
Control variables       
Capital (lagged) -0.008 -0.216 0.018 0.305 0.227** 0.6 
 (0.142) (0.186) (0.222) (0.265) (0.096) (0.408) 
Liquidity (lagged) 0.02 -0.093 0.031 -0.472** -0.077 -0.517* 
 (0.08) (0.212) (0.08) (0.225) (0.209) (0.256) 
Return on assets (lagged) 0.062** 0.19* 0.058** -0.027 -0.164 -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.125) (0.024) (0.03) (0.151) (0.028) 
Stock exchange listing -0.051 0.039 -0.2 0.003 -0.298* 0.6 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.249) (0.248) (0.155) (0.416) 
Industrial growth (lagged) 0.031** 0.032* 0.029 0.081** 0.045* 0.115** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.031) 0.029 (0.052) 
F-statistic 2.09 2.78 2.03 3.99 2.39 4.47 
Prob(F-stat>0) 0.03 0.03 0.057 0 0.054 0 
Pseudo R-square 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.15 
No. of observations 319 135 184 319 135 184 
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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In easy regime we also obtain results similar to those of total advances 
regressions. State-owned banks lend more in both short term and medium term even 
though interest rate increases in previous period. However, old private banks only 
supply more short term loans in easy regime, perhaps because it is less risky than 
expanding medium-term loans. 
Concerning control variables in Table 13, one point which is noteworthy is that 
banks’ responses to industrial growth are much higher for medium term credit than for 
short-term credit. This is line with the fact that medium term advances are mostly 
provided to manufacturing firms as working capital.   
5.  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we analyze the effect of ownership on bank lending under 
different monetary regimes in the context of an important emerging economy. This 
empirical exercise has shown that banks of different types respond very differently to 
monetary policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public and foreign 
banks cut back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to 
be affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy some 
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of 
monetary tightening.  
In general the results support the existence of a bank lending channel in India 
but it is a peculiar one. It can either reinforce or attenuate, or even counteract the 
traditional effect of monetary policies. Public banks have been found to play a 
smoothing role in general (Micco and Panizza, 2006) but it is necessary to distinguish 
their responses under different regimes. The result of this chapter shows that Indian 
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public banks, following important reforms, are very active in responding to monetary 
shocks in under different monetary regimes.  
The chapter has shown evidence of asymmetry of the effect of monetary policy 
on bank lending. When previous period regime is tight banks respond negatively to 
monetary shocks but when previous period regime is easy they do not respond or do so 
positively to monetary shocks.   
Finally, the results of this chapter further stress the need to take careful 
consideration of the ownership structure of the banking system when policy measures 
are prescribed. Moreover, existing monetary environment should also be an important 
factor to be considered due to the asymmetric effect of monetary policy. As for many 
transition economies in Eastern Europe where the percentage of assets in banks with 
majority foreign ownership is high (Bonin et al., 2005) the findings of this chapter 
should warrant some extra attention for the conduct of monetary policy because foreign 
banks are much more responsive to monetary tightening than domestic banks.  
 
 




 CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS 
  
Institutions determine the incentive structure of an economy and, in turn, the 
structure shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation or decline 
(North, 1991). Institutions create the favourable environment for division of labour, 
specialization and trade to take place, thus generating growth. Since the 1990s the role 
of institutions has been evaluated in many empirical studies and the literature is still 
expanding fast.  
The collapse of the planned economic system in former socialist countries and 
their reforms toward market economy have offered a good socio-economic experiment 
for us to study the effect of institutions for the purpose of further understanding 
institutions and possibly offering guidance for future reform steps in transition countries 
in particular and others that are also striving to achieve economic growth and prosperity 
in general. 
This thesis has tried to examine the effect of institutions in transition economies 
in three directions: efficiency, investment and credit supply by banks. In general, the 
thesis finds positive effect of institutions on efficiency and investment rates in transition 
economies. It also shows that different ownerships of banks have significantly different 
effects on credit supply by banks.  
With regard to efficiency, the thesis shows that higher quality of institutions, 
both economic and political, is associated with higher efficiency in transition 
economies. This result is robust to different rates of depreciation that are used to 
estimate the capital series for these countries. This result is in line with other studies in 
different context (Kaufmann et al. 1999; Meon and Weill, 2005). So far the empirical 
result about the effect of political freedom on economic performance has been mixed 




but this empirical study shows that it does have significant role in improving efficiency, 
at least in the context of transition economies. Of course institutions do not solely 
determine efficiency but improvement of institutional quality should help transition 
economies to gain higher efficiency. This thesis also shows that for transition 
economies the translog production function is more appropriate for estimating 
efficiency than the usual Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Investment is the vehicle of growth and efficiency. Without investment, growth 
cannot be sustained. More importantly, investment is the channel of “creative 
destruction” that both raises production capacity and improves efficiency. This thesis 
shows that institutional factors play a significant role in explaining investment 
differences, therefore positively affecting growth. In general, higher degree of both 
economic and political freedoms is associated with higher rate of investment to GDP 
ratio. However, it should be stressed that one aspect of economic institution alone 
would not make much difference. It is the overall bettering of the economic institutions 
that matter in inducing investment. As far as political freedom is concerned both 
political rights and civil liberties are important in promoting investment through the 
effect of political rights is stronger than that of civil liberties. In addition, this thesis 
shows that those who are ahead in the transition process have higher investment rate, 
especially with regard to large scale privatization.  
On the effect of ownership on bank lending the thesis finds that banks’ loan 
supply is asymmetric in the sense that, for some bank groups (public and foreign-
owned), it is significantly cut down in a tight monetary regime but not so in an easy 
regime. In addition, banks of different types respond very differently to monetary 
policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public and foreign banks cut 




back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to be 
affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they 
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of 
monetary tightening. In other words, ownership makes a difference in terms of loan 
supply by banks for a given monetary policy and monetary condition and the ownership 
structure of the banking system plays a role in determining the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in an economy that is a process of transition from a public-dominated 
system to a more liberalized and competitive system.  
The thesis has several weaknesses. First, the measure of institutions is open to 
criticism because of subjectivity and imprecision. Second, the causal relationship 
between institutions and efficiency and investment rates are is not tested. The third is 
that the case of India might not represent the situation in many other developing and 
transition economies. However, we believe this thesis can serve as additional evidence 
in support of building high quality institutions for economic performance and as 
encouragement for transition and developing countries to step up their reforms toward 





1.  TABLES  
Table A2.1 
Estimation result with Political Rights and Civil Liberties  
with translog production function 
 
 Translog without regional dummy Translog with EA dummy 
 PR CL PR CL 
Production frontier     
Constant 6.33** (1.91) 6.45 (1.81) 9.69*** (3.19) 11.48 (3.77) 
k -0.34 (-1.3) -0.29 (-1.13) -0.64** (-2.63) -0.74 (-3.06) 
l 136*** (7.08) 1.29*** (6.92) 1.41*** (8.86) 1.33 (8.07) 
k2 0.03*** (30.1) 0.03*** (30.38) 0.03*** (30.8) 0.03 (29.17) 
l2 -0.02 (-1.17) -0.01 (-0.93) -0.03** (-2.48) -0.04** (-2.72) 
kl -0.02 (-1.26) -0.02 (-1.38) -0.002 (-0.13) 0.005 (0.28) 
time -0.02*** (-4.2) -0.02*** (-4.93) -0.02*** (-4.01) -0.02*** (-5.16) 
Efficiency effects     
Constant -30.7*** (-21.8) -33.87*** (-18.49) -32.1*** (-20.63) -35.97*** (-18.52) 
COMP1 1.89*** (10.41) 1.05*** (5.65) 1.14*** (4.01) 0.23 (1.51) 
COMP2 3.7*** (7.6) 2.45*** (5.17) 2.1*** (4.6) 0.47 (1.59) 
PR 1.2** (2.94) - 2.69*** (5.1) - 
CL - 3.3*** (9.92)  4.72*** (12.67) 
EA dummy - - -13.49*** (-5.16) -17.15*** (-11.8) 
time  1.7*** (10.21) 1.13*** (10.23) 1.04*** (4.15) 0.69*** (8.2) 
σ2 12.72*** 
(12.42) 





0.99*** (3837.9) 0.99*** (2688.5) 
Log likelihood  -202.18 -184.48 -193.74 -168.59 
Likelihood ratio test 832.96 868.36 849.85 900.15 
T-ratios are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Higher 











Translog production function with 10% and 6% depreciation rates, and with China 
(CHN) and Cambodia-Vietnam (CBD_VN) dummies 
 
 10% depreciation 6% depreciation 
Production frontier   
Constant 11.11*** (3.8) 47.28*** (47.51) 
k -0.73*** (-3.47) -2.22*** (-27.04) 
l 1.36*** (8.02) -0.72** (-3.46) 
k2 0.03** (30.61) 0.021*** (34.8) 
l2 -0.04** (-3.15) -0.07*** (-5.2) 
kl 0.004 (0.26) 0.12** (2.04) 
time -0.026*** (-3.76) -0.04*** (-68.6) 
Efficiency effect   
Constant -33.41*** (-28.54) -10.27*** (-12.47) 
COMP1 0.92*** (7.18) 0.58*** (5.24) 
COMP2 1.7*** (5.73) 2.79*** (8.71) 
FHI 3.59*** (14.99) 1.52*** (9.95) 
CHN -20.61** (-3.27) -1.91*** (-4.09) 
CBD_VN -14.81*** (-12.53) -5.19*** (-5.9) 
time 0.87*** (9.33) 0.31** (3.3) 
σ2 12.26*** (13.26) 3.97*** (22) 
γ 0.99*** (2966.5) 0.99 (0.98E+8) 
Log likelihood -182.29 -427.82 
Likelihood ratio test 871.4 382.57 
T-ratios are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  








Transition economies and averages of variables used in the regressions (1990-2007) 
 




Albania 20.34 56.20 3.72 3.64 2.813 -5.979 59.70 61.64 29.58 0.04 12.07 
Armenia 22.43 61.70 4.15 3.39 3.757 0.703 80.13 21.10 375.50 20.27 12.50 
Azerbaijan 29.46 48.21 5.44 2.91 3.778 23.109 92.35 21.01 232.01 8.4 15.12 
Belarus 25.51 41.00 5.59 2.06 2.776 23.464 122.54 19.83 338.90 -28.81 20.27 
Bulgaria 17.99 53.66 2.11 3.55 0.775 13.786 108.89 57.32 91.14 2.3 16.86 
Cambodia 14.48 59.10 5.72 n.a. 8.571 5.1236 86.63 14.54 3.64 13.16 5.63 
China 35.18 52.95 6.72 n.a. 9.983 42.542 47.42 126.74 5.76 2.03 14.97 
Croatia 21.50 51.81 3.06 3.96 1.373 14.233 103.15 50.14 137.14 9.4 24.22 
Czech 
Republic 
27.57 67.86 1.47 4.01 2.021 27.475 117.03 68.64 8.76 2.51 21.64 
Estonia 26.84 73.28 1.68 3.84 2.702 24.419 151.71 41.16 71.65 -7.81 19.90 
Georgia 20.60 55.60 4.06 3.38 -1.652 2.5051 79.67 12.24 1286.97 21.92 11.20 
Hungary 21.62 61.26 1.47 4.06 1.793 23.065 110.38 48.73 14.54 4.34 10.64 
Kazakhstan 23.26 51.78 5.38 3.22 2.211 25.443 90.47 19.65 277.01 n.a. 12.29 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
16.39 56.09 4.65 3.62 0.027 4.902 85.55 17.74 117.84 23.15 19.25 
Lao PDR 28.50 39.41 6.50 n.a. 6.42 17.881 60.53 15.99 23.74 8.68 7.77 
Latvia 20.87 64.58 1.88 3.78 1.974 21.072 100.75 32.67 73.39 6.13 19.07 
Lithuania 22.60 63.98 1.68 3.74 1.595 16.294 107.27 28.02 96.96 -0.64 18.85 
Macedonia 17.35 58.63 3.25 3.88 0.482 7.0175 93.49 29.18 118.61 13.32 19.95 
Moldova 19.14 54.47 3.68 3.24 -2.734 8.357 113.83 31.14 137.48 8.96 17.74 
Mongolia 28.57 56.15 2.42 3.44 2.719 19.684 120.67 30.91 49.19 29.66 17.85 
Poland 19.90 58.94 1.53 4.10 3.942 19.315 58.36 39.23 16.18 7.55 19.45 
Romania 20.32 51.32 2.83 3.51 1.205 16.267 64.11 33.97 71.32 1.71 11.00 
Russia 19.76 51.61 4.38 3.26 0.398 32.5 57.57 26.32 182.12 9.67 17.64 
Slovak 
Republic 
28.57 60.27 1.89 3.97 2.564 23.892 133.02 61.10 9.10 5.64 21.70 
Slovenia 23.37 58.79 1.41 3.97 2.88 24.924 120.47 40.35 27.15 27.49 19.15 
Tajikistan 14.94 47.35 5.88 2.78 -1.272 9.058 111.10 7.83 180.02 -1.61 12.47 
Turkmenistan 33.21 43.02 6.89 1.66 -1.787 32.885 135.71 16.08 647.15 n.a. 13.39 
Ukraine 21.68 47.67 3.47 2.91 -1.655 25.128 88.20 29.15 379.08 -4.56 19.41 
Uzbekistan 26.48 40.51 6.56 2.30 2.483 21.93 59.28 n.a. 220.74 n.a. 19.77 
Vietnam 29.14 44.35 6.72 N/A 7.509 21.745 104.74 48.05 15.36 6.37 7.23 
 1 as % of GDP; 2 only available from 1995. Source: WBDI (2008), Heritage Foundation (2008), Freedom 
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Figure 4.1: Movement of prime lending rate and other policy rates
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